August 2021 ~ All About Crime And Narco News

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Tuesday, August 31, 2021

The Zetas’ Model of Organized Crime is Leaving Mexico in Ruins

 

The Zetas’ Model of Organized Crime is Leaving Mexico in Ruins


It was a Saturday, around 12:30 p.m. local time, when a caravan of three vehicles loaded with well-armed men and at least one woman began a violent rampage through Reynosa, a Mexican city of about 700,000 people that borders McAllen, Texas, and serves as an important hub for numerous criminal groups. 


According to a detailed account by the local news outlet Elefante Blanco, the caravan began in the eastern part of the city, stopped and robbed a car, then continued to a neighborhood near the city center where the carnage began in earnest. 


They first shot and killed seven men inside a house. Then they traveled to another neighborhood and shot and killed two more men. A short distance away, they shot and killed two other men. Seconds later, they shot and killed two women and a man from the same family and stole the vehicle they were driving. 


An hour and 15 minutes after the rampage began, local authorities finally confronted at least part of the caravan near the Pharr-Reynosa International Bridge, connecting the city to the United States. Shots were fired. One of the attackers was killed and another captured. Inside one of the cars, authorities found two women bound and gagged. 


Several other alleged assailants fled. Authorities caught up to them again some six hours later. Authorities said more gunfire was exchanged; four of the alleged attackers, one of whom was a woman, were killed. 


SEE ALSO: Guns in the Gulf – Mexico’s Navy Called to Protect Against Pirates


However, the other victims were civilians, according to Elefante Blanco, citing interviews and social media posts from neighbors, politicians, and colleagues of the dead. They included a nursing student, a person who worked at a local maquila, a shop owner and another person in that shop. 


Indeed, the rampage seemed designed to inflict maximum civilian casualties. In all, at least 14 of those killed had no criminal ties, and the state governor later lamented the massacre of “civilians.” Shortly after, authorities touted the arrests of more than a dozen suspects, including the alleged Gulf Cartel boss in the city of Rio Brazo, known as “La Vaca,” who officials said they’d been after for more than two years. 


The timely captures by a troubled special operations group were curious, especially since relatives of two of those captured said they had been kidnapped in April. And the explanations for the massacre were even less forthcoming. Was it a fight between factions of what is left of the once-vaunted Gulf Cartel? Perhaps it was an effort by a faction of what is left from the Zetas to displace their rivals? In either case, the armed group had sent a message: no one is safe. 


‘So You Learn to Respect Us’

In 2006, when the Zetas were but a speck in the constellation of criminal organizations, they captured a couple of police in Acapulco, cut off their heads and left a message that read: “So you learn to respect us.” 

Later, the words “Para que aprendan a respetar” appeared on flag-like logos circulating on the internet. It was impossible to know if the Zetas had promulgated the expression or the internet logo, but it stuck, and for good reason. 


The core of the Zetas model was fear. Formed by several Mexican Special Forces deserters in the late 1990s, they operated first as the enforcement arm for the Gulf Cartel’s leader, Osiel Cárdenas. The Gulf Cartel’s birthplace was the stretch of land between Reynosa and Matamoros, a key corridor for drug trafficking, contraband, human smuggling, human trafficking, kidnapping and extortion.


Cárdenas was from Matamoros, but he was not satisfied with just that territory, so in the mid-2000s, after he’d used the Zetas to secure important sections of the northeastern border with the United States, he sent them to places like the southern state of Guerrero – where Acapulco is, and where rivals had long operated – and Michoacán, a perennial epicenter of drug production and trafficking. Eventually, the Zetas’ leaders would find a seat at the table, trafficking drugs with the Gulf Cartel’s upper echelon. 


The Zetas soon began to mold other organizations and make their own name, not just with spectacular beheadings of police and ominous messages, but with a new way of operating. The model was based on control of physical space, for which the Zetas were built. Using a combination of sophisticated technology, military tactics and brutal violence, the group exerted their will over wide swaths of territory where they collected rent from all illegal and legal enterprises in those areas. 


They did not necessarily run these businesses. They simply taxed them. These included everything from contraband liquor to prostitution, local drug peddling, theft and retail. They also kidnapped migrants and extorted local businesses. The difference between them and the traditional cartels was stark. They won territory first, then usurped every business in that space. The underworld refrain that it is best not to calentar la plaza (heat up the plaza) to keep authorities away did not apply. There were no negotiations, no alliances, and no mercy for those who disobeyed. They lived by another refrain: Para que aprendan a respetar.


While the Zetas’ top leaders began to partake in some of the international drug trafficking activities of the Gulf Cartel, as illustrated in this 2009 US indictment, the lower echelons made money from the extraction of these rents and predatory criminal activities. The model served the Gulf Cartel, since it made it easier to finance their mini-army and their expansion into places like Guerrero and Michoacán. 


It worked. According to a Harvard study, between 1998 and 2010, the Zetas expanded to 33 new municipalities per year, the most of any criminal group; the Gulf Cartel was second during that time period, expanding to just under 20 per year. But, as the Gulf leaders and others would find out, this expansion came with a heavy price.


When Mexican authorities captured Cárdenas in 2003, the Zetas began a process of excising themselves from the Gulf Cartel. Part of this impetus came from their varied criminal portfolio, afforded to them because of their new criminal model. Part of it came from ambition. As the Dallas Morning News reported, part of it came from a sense of betrayal, specifically that Cárdenas himself was turning state’s evidence against them after he was extradited to the United States in 2007. He pleaded guilty in 2009 and was sentenced to 25 years in prison.


War followed. Fighting was particularly intense along the northeast corridor where both had operated for so many years. Few knew, but it was the beginning of a process that would eventually lead to the chaotic June 2021 massacre in Reynosa and many more like it across Mexico over the last decade. 


Derivatives of Derivatives

While the schism between the Zetas and the Gulf Cartel was growing, other similar criminal organizations emerged. The most notable of them was the Familia Michoacana. Although it took its name from its home state of Michoacán, it followed at least part of the Zetas’ model: international drug trafficking at the top; territorial control, extraction of rent, extortion and kidnapping at the bottom. It differed in the way it sought more regular local political connections. 


And for a while, as it did with the Zetas, the Familia Michoacana strategy worked. It expanded. But soon, the Familia Michoacana was also splitting at the seams. It now forms part of a pantheon of groups operating in Michoacán, Jalisco and the state of Mexico.  


SEE ALSO: Indigenous Latest to Suffer Plague of Disappearances in Sonora, Mexico


The same process was playing out in other areas. In Tijuana, what was left of the various factions of the Tijuana Cartel were fighting for local, as well as international, markets. In Juárez, numerous groups began fighting for local criminal markets at the same time as the Juárez and Sinaloa cartels sought control of the important international trafficking corridor. In Acapulco, numerous former elements of the Beltrán Leyva Organization sought control of the local drug market and parts of the international market.


But none of these multilayered battles played out as brutally as the one for the northeast corridor. It’s not exactly clear why, but it certainly did not help that the Zetas and the Gulf Cartel were both born in the area and knew each other intimately. By 2012, the Zetas themselves split, unable to corral their own members who had entered into local criminal markets. There are now at least four different factions, according to InSight Crime’s last count. The Gulf Cartel suffered its own schisms, splitting into at least three factions, at least two of whom appeared to be involved in the battle on June 19. 


It was, in many ways, inevitable. The Zetas proved that via fearsome messaging and brutal tactics, you could control territory and thus secure numerous local criminal rents, even while you vied for action in the international market. Most of these factions now do the same, focusing on local criminal markets where the bar for entering is far lower than for international markets than seeking a seat at the table with the international players. In the process, they too suffer their own schisms. 


Over time, these derivatives of derivatives have become even more primitive than the Zetas once were, which leads us to the June massacre in Reynosa. In late July, three groups along the Reynosa-Matamoros corridor left messages in various public places that they had reached a peace agreement.


"We have families, too," one part read.


Still, few believe the peace will hold, and in early August, the Attorney General’s Office captured another five suspects they linked to the case. Authorities also pointed to two derivatives of the Gulf Cartel as the culprits: the Ciclones (Cyclones) and Escorpiones (Scorpions), who may have teamed up to battle the Metros, another Gulf derivative.


Tentacles of Illegal Octopus Trade Clutch Mexico Town

 


Tentacles of Illegal Octopus Trade Clutch Mexico Town


Seizures of illegally harvested octopus off Mexico’s Yucatán peninsula are shedding light on how corruption in a coastal community facilitates the black market in marine life.


In late July, a string of five seizures occurred in quick succession in the coastal town of the Dzilam de Bravo. The first capture took place July 22 when state police uncovered 720 kilograms of illegally harvested octopus at a highway checkpoint.



Later that week two separate seizures occurred involving vehicles that carried several hundred kilograms of octopus out of Dzilam de Bravo.


Then, on July 26, authorities searched a shop near the town’s port, where they discovered six tons of octopus. The store was owned by a man identified by authorities only by the alias “Tango.”


A second raid occurred simultaneously at a fishing company owned by a man whom identified as Jesus A., alias “Chucho Erros.” Some 1.5 tons of illegally harvested seafood – including octopus, shark, and sea cucumber – was seized in the shop’s hidden cellar. Three arrests were made during the raids, but both Tango and Chucho Erros managed to duck authorities.


State news outlets alleged that both traffickers had been warned by the municipal police before federal forces arrived.


InSight Crime Analysis

Though widespread illegal fishing is blamed for the decimation of marine life off the Yucatán Peninsula, the trade often depends on local corruption, particularly in fishing communities.   


According to news reports, Armando Herrera, Dzilam de Bravo’s mayor, has been accused multiple times by residents of taking bribes from fishermen operating illegally in the area. There are no reports, however, that he has been ever formally charged with a crime.


SEE ALSO :Guns in the Gulf – Mexico’s Navy Called to Protect Against Pirates


Meanwhile, municipal police director Miguel Polanco, who previously threatened a journalist reporting on the mayor, allegedly refused to notify Mexico’s national fishing authority, the National Commission of Aquaculture and Fishing (Comisión Nacional de Acuacultura y Pesca – CONAPESCA), of the arrest of three fishermen poaching octopus who claimed their catch was destined for a shop belonging to Herrera.


The escape of both octopus traffickers in the recent seizure suggests that they were tipped off.


Octopus represents a massive industry in Yucatán, employing some 12,000 fishermen. In recent years, anywhere from 13,000 to 24,000 tons of octopus have been legally fished each year in the waters off the peninsula. Roughly 60 percent of the catch is exported to Asia, Europe and the Americas, while the rest is sold within Mexico. The season for octopus fishing lasts about five months from August to mid-December.


According to Admiral Héctor Alberto Mucharraz, CONAPESCA’s director of Inspection and Surveillance, Dzilam de Bravo is one of four main zones for illegal fishing in Yucatan, a state that saw 660 tons of illegal marine life seized between 2014 and 2018.


As popular marine products like grouper and sea cucumber are becoming scarcer, so too is octopus, which can fetch an initial price of roughly $3 per kilogram locally but rises to nearly $10 when sold on international markets.


Criminal gangs have even attempted to profit from the trade in octopus. In 2017, more than a dozen tractor-trailers carrying multi-ton loads were hijacked by gangs on Mexico’s highways.

Thursday, August 26, 2021

Indigenous Latest to Suffer Plague of Disappearances in Sonora, Mexico

 


Indigenous Latest to Suffer Plague of Disappearances in Sonora, Mexico


The ongoing search for members of Mexico’s Yaqui Indigenous community, missing for well over a month, has become a rallying cry for activists pointing to the shocking number of disappearances in northern Sonora state.


On July 14, 10 people left the Yaqui community of Loma de Bácum in southern Sonora to drive a herd of cattle to a festival being held at the Agua Caliente Ranch, some 85 kilometers to the north.


They never made it. Nothing has been heard from them since.


In early August, Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador vowed authorities were searching for them. And on August 24, during a visit to Sonora, he acknowledged the toll that the Indigenous community was paying due to violence on its lands.


SEE ALSO: Mexico Cartels Find Recruitment Target - Drug Rehab Centers


“The Yaqui governors have accepted the participation of the Defense Ministry, the Navy, the National Guard (on their lands). This will greatly help to guarantee peace,” he said during a speech. He also blamed a rise in violence in Sonora on an increase in fentanyl trafficking.


But for the Yaqui community, the answer went beyond drug trafficking interests. They claim this was the latest act in a systematic campaign to dislodge them from their lands or quell protests against a gas pipeline and mining concessions. Two well-known Yaqui leaders were killed in Sonora in May and June.


How much effort is being expended to find the missing is also in dispute. Media reports have spoken of a grandiose search operation involving up to 12 local and national government agencies, as well as drones and helicopters. Sonora's Attorney General’s Office stated that personal protection and psychological support had been offered to the relatives of the missing men from the outset.


But Guadalupe Flores Maldonado, a member of the Yaqui guard in Loma de Bácum, told a very different story.


“Until now, no official, nobody from the state or federal government has come here to offer their help. And they haven’t sent the National Guard, the Marines, the Defense Ministry, the police or investigators who are meant to be helping,” she told Animal Político in early August.


InSight Crime Analysis

The Yaqui are just one facet of Sonora’s tragedy. Since 2015, over 4,000 people have disappeared in the state, according to figures from authorities and victims’ associations.


“These cases are often not declared ... but we have observed an average of four people a day reported as disappeared,” Manuel Emilio Hoyos, director of the Sonora Observatory for Security, told El Sol de Hermosillo, a local newspaper.


The disappearances cut across social divides. In 2021, there has been a marked increase in cases involving women. InSight Crime found that 41 women were reported as having disappeared between January and April 2021, as opposed to 82 cases declared in all of 2020.


SEE ALSO: Guns in the Gulf – Mexico’s Navy Called to Protect Against Pirates


Migrants trying to reach the United States border are also at risk. While there are no reliable numbers about such disappearances, over 250 have been reported missing in northern Mexico since March 2020, including Sonora.


Sonora is not even the worst-affected part of Mexico, ranking fifth among the states with the most disappearances since 2019.


Sonora’s wave of disappearances are the result of a complex web of factors: criminal groups controlling vast stretches of land through which they prepare, package and transport drugs, contraband and migrants; unmotivated, ill-prepared, corrupt or overwhelmed local authorities who routinely ignore warning signs and do not give disappearance cases high priority; and large, economic interests that may intersect with criminal interests.


The result is almost complete impunity. Only cases out of the ordinary seem to get much attention from the press and, by extension, authorities. For example, last April, 30 Mexican Marines were arrested for their role in several forced disappearances in 2014. The most recent case of the missing Yaqui members is another. But more is needed.


Civil society organizations working to find the missing are being targeted.


On August 24, the same day López Obrador visited Sonora, dozens of activists gathered in Mexico City for a protest and issued a statement calling for greater protection from the state. One of those being commemorated was Aranza Ramos, a 28-year-old woman from Sonora who had joined search parties organized by Madres Buscadoras (Searching Mothers) to find her husband, missing since December 2020. She participated in uncovering mass graves and reportedly received several threats before being gunned down in July at her home in Guaymas, Sonora.


The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) have both called on the government to investigate Ramos’ death and protect her family.


Meanwhile, the Ramos family, as well as the Yaqui community, continue to wait for answers.

Wednesday, August 25, 2021

Mexico Cartels Find Recruitment Target - Drug Rehab Centers

 


Mexico Cartels Find Recruitment Target - Drug Rehab Centers

Lacking government support and effective oversight, drug rehab centers in Mexico are being exploited by organized crime groups, which are taking advantage of their anarchical state to disappear people and recruit lookouts, hitmen and drug dealers.


While the phenomenon is well-known, it does not seem to be of interest to the authorities or society at large, but rather only to those directly affected by it. Meanwhile, the consumption of drugs, such as marihuana and methamphetamines, has already surpassed alcohol consumption in some states. Nevertheless, access to adequate addiction treatment remains limited.

The Mexican Government has long overlooked the issues surrounding addiction rehab centers. While they continue to be featured in political campaigns and national development plans, nothing materializes, as it is considered to be a burden that neither the municipalities, nor the states, nor the federal government, are willing to bear – even less so now that funding for civil society organizations has been cut off.


President Andrés Manuel López Obrador even used the issue as a shield when asked about insecurity and violence in Mexico. On August 23 in 2019, during one of his morning press conferences, the president declared that it is necessary to reduce drug consumption before talking about peacebuilding. Words that remained recorded but that have yet to be reflected in public policies.





AMLO spoke on drug addiction rehabilitation in 2019, but his words have yet to be reflected in public policies. Photo: Mexican Government









When asked about the fight against drugs on that occasion, AMLO responded: “If consumption continues to go up, things will become even more complicated for us. We have to reduce consumption, hence the youth-oriented campaign, after we do all that, and we start to have more control and better results, then we are going to look at pacification, the call to action to reintegrate those who have taken the path of antisocial behavior, who could join, who could not, and under what conditions.”  


A campaign carried out by the National Commission against Addictions (Comisión Nacional contra las Adicciones - Conadic) features radio and television spots: “You didn't have to die. First my dad and then you. Because of alcohol.” But rather than raising awareness, the campaign has been mocked for the dramatization employed. Still, no action has been taken regarding providing treatment, which has historically been delegated to private initiatives that have set up rehabilitation centers with their own capital, loans or resources from previous governments, despite the lack of regulation. Authorities are not even aware of the existence of some of these rehabilitation centers.



The lack of supervision and disregard among the various levels of government becomes evident only when misfortune occurs in the "anexos," as the privately operated rehabilitation centers are called, such as deaths due to the excessive use of force, torture or the forced internment of residents. The situation has been aggravated by the presence of organized crime groups, which have filled the institutional vacuum, charging “rental fees” or using the annexes to expand their illicit businesses and even committing massacres inside the centers.


The Problems

The pride surrounding the inauguration of a new facility, presumed to be the first with such and such characteristics; the initial discharges of residents who are believed to have kicked their drug habits; and the willingness of good Samaritans are diminished over time by the lack of support and the day-to-day problems faced by rehabilitation centers. Authorities do not know exactly how many drug addiction rehabilitation centers exist in Mexico.


Iraís Alcázar, the advisor of an annex in Ensenada, says that not even the people connected to these centers know how many there are in total, “because they pop up like fungi, and just as people open many with good hearts, who have or who have a family member that has experienced some kind of addiction, as there are those who are self-interested with actions bordering on criminal and there is no one to stop them.”


“One of the main problems we go through in the annexes, is the lack of shared responsibility on the part of the health authorities that have left the phenomenon up to God’s will and have washed their hands of it. There are few government-owned centers because they know that they will not find business there. For them, it is like a money pit – worse now with austerity policies, because if childcare centers and other institutions lose their support, what can substance (abuse centers) expect,” Alcázar said.


The main difficulties for such centers include obsolescence and a lack of facility maintenance; inadequate resident stays, a lack of hygiene, overcrowding; promiscuity among male, female and adolescent inmates; the lack of capacity and training among operators; violent treatment and forced internment. Addicts often lack economic resources, and families are often are unable to pay the bill -- with the most affordable stays at centers starting at 2,000 pesos (about $100) per month.

Many of the addiction treatment centers are almost maxed out and flout norms. “I estimate, from the annexes I know of, that 40 percent of them present irregularities. I do not even know if they are registered or are clandestine, as many of them are,” Alcázar said.


The Violence

Apart from the common operational issues at these centers, another result of the lack of state control is how organized crime has positioned itself to control some of the hundreds of rehabilitation centers in the country, both registered and clandestine.


Based on recent events, it is known that many of the annexes serve as a place to stash people reported as missing and as hideouts or operational centers for criminals with arrest warrants out for them or that are wanted by the authorities. They have become safe houses to inflict torture upon debtors or adversaries. Families members are extorted. They serve as recruitment centers for hitmen or drug dealers; others serve as a point of sale. This explains the extreme violence in these facilities, starting with the frequent deaths due to disciplinary measures to the massacres that have taken place within them in the country.


On January 24, 2015, five workers at the CIDA rehabilitation center in Ensenada were investigated for the murder of an addict transferred to the center. On March 31 of that same year, armed gunned attacked the Alcance Victoria center, located in the Buenos Aires neighborhood in Tijuana, wounding three men inside. On January 12, 2016, a young man, who had been beaten to death, appeared outside an annex in Chula Vista, also in Tijuana. These are a few of the near-daily incidents.  


In 2018, violence increased at the centers. On January 9, Adolfo Osuna was murdered. He was the founder of a rehabilitation center called "Soldados Nuevos," or "New Soldiers," in Comondú, Baja California Sur. Then, on January 28, in Tlajomulco, Jalisco, an “annexed,” as rehab center residents are called, was beaten to death. On February 11, a businessman was shot to death at an addiction center for alcoholics. On August 7, in El Salto, Jalisco, another center resident was beaten to death at a site that was ironically named “Volver a Vivir de Nuevo,” or “Back to Living Again.” And on October 25, two women and three men were shot in front of an annex in the Campos neighborhood in Tijuana.


The attacks continued in 2019. On April 5, hitmen left behind a threatening note after throwing a grenade, which didn’t go off, at an addiction rehabilitation center in Oaxaca. On August 14, an armed group broke into another rehabilitation site in the Santiago branch in Manzanillo, Colima, shooting six inmates. On December 5, in the center “Dios es mi Salvador,” or “God is my Savior,” another gang forcibly took 26 young addicts with them. And in Ensenada, members of the military seized a ton of marijuana in front of an annex in Maneadero.

Last year was also violent. On January 14, authorities liberated seven women who had been locked up in a rehabilitation center in Tala, Jalisco. On June 7, assassins broke into the Irapuato rehabilitation annex and murdered 10 people. On July 1, in a different annex in the same city, 28 inmates were shot dead. Two days later, 25 addicts fled violence and threats at a rehabilitation center in Valle de Santiago, Guanajuato. On October 24, another armed group killed four people in the "Fuente de Vida," “Fountain of Life” annex in Celaya.


Other dates and places where people were shot, beaten to death or strangled in 2020: in Playas de Tijuana on October 13; in Teuchitlán, Jalisco, on November 20; and in Monterrey, on the 30th of the same month. While in 2021, a resident was bound, gagged and beaten in the Polanco settlement in Guadalajara; and another addict was tortured and beaten to death at a treatment center in the capital of Puebla state.


The Recruitment

These centers have actively served as sites to recruit “halcones,” a term used for lookouts, dealers and hitmen. This has been noted in the scant police investigations on the issue. One of these investigations came in May 2016, when the Jalisco Public Prosecutor's Office discovered that the “Despertar Espiritual,” or “Spiritual Awakening,” rehabilitation center was mistreating and forcibly holding as many as 271 people, 144 of them women and 18 of them minors, in the Tonalá municipality.


The prosecutor at the time, Eduardo Almaguer, indicated that the Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación – CJNG) was behind the rehabilitation center: “I would like to tell you that there is a line of inquiry which makes us very clearly surmise a link with organized crime, since eleven people were hidden here, eleven subjects with arrest warrants operating here in the state, they are a group of delinquents and criminals," he said.


Subsequently, on August 21, 2020, in Zapopan, the kidnapping of a police officer and his companion led authorities in Jalisco to a ranch house in the municipality, where they not only found the two individuals in a room, handcuffed and severely beaten, but about 100 more interned individuals, including women and adolescents in what turned out to be a clandestine annex. Twelve people were arrested, and five of them were sent to prison, but the prosecution did not reveal details about the case.


The most recent case to expose drug trafficking operations at the drug rehabilitation annexes occurred on November 2, 2020, when a dozen heavily armed young men in Mexicali – alleged to be members of a criminal organization – were arrested. Municipal and state police arrested the suspects in a building in the Independencia neighborhood, where they were positioned by the "Los Salazar," a group operating in Baja California for the Sinaloa Cartel's "Los Chapitos."


The youths, largely addicted to toxic substances, were allegedly recruited weeks beforehand in an annex in Mazatlán, Sinaloa, called “Oportunidad de Vida,” or “Life Opportunity.” In exchange for the payment of two thousand pesos per week, they moved to Mexicali to seize territories held by Felipe Eduardo Barajas Lozano, alias “El Omega." Barajas Lozano is allied with Jesús Alexander Sánchez Félix, alias “El Ruso,” who serves under Sinaloa Cartel kingpin Ismael Zambada, "El Mayo." El Mayo's faction is currently in a feud with "Los Chapitos," the faction of the cartel led by the sons of Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán. Young people are linked to various homicides in the region.


One of the cartels to pioneer the employment of addicts at rehabilitation centers in the early 2000s was the Familia Michoacana. The Juarez Cartel later imitated them, placing gang members at the centers. However, the Familia Michoacana case was even more peculiar because the recruitment involved a religious and emotional indoctrination, according to criminals who later became protected witnesses for the Attorney General's Office.


Each addict recruited by the cartel operated by Nazario Moreno González, alias“El Más Loco,” Jesús Méndez, alias “El Chuy,” and Servando Gómez Martínez, alias “La Tuta,” he had to bring three or four more youths to participate in the self-improvement retreats called "Man to Man," “Fourth Step” and “Fifth Step,” which were conducted as congregations at ranches or farmhouses. The criminal cells also had to send six of their men for every plaza in Michoacán.


Under the name of the centers, they taught about the "values" of the Familia Michoacana and God. They were indoctrinated to believe that "the hitmen received a divine order to murder or kidnap, but that all this was because God allowed it," they said. They would give them Bibles to share with other people and invite them to become hitmen at the end of the course. Addicts could voluntarily decide to join or not. Addicts who showed no interest were returned to the annexes.


Today, it is said that in some entities, the supervision of rehabilitation centers is carried out by the criminal groups themselves, which have access to databases and oversee the annexes. It seems like something out of a fictional novel but continues to be a strange reality.


Source: https://insightcrime.org/news/mexico-cartels-find-recruitment-target-drug-rehab-centers/

Friday, August 20, 2021

How Human Trafficking Worsened in Mexico During COVID-19

 

How Human Trafficking Worsened in Mexico During COVID-19


The number of human trafficking victims in Mexico is growing, as traffickers target vulnerable people hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic.


Mexican authorities identified at least 550 victims of human trafficking in 2020, a 43 percent increase from the 383 victims recorded in 2016, according to data from the Executive Secretariat for Public Security (Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública - SESNSP) and cited in a report by Hispanics in Philanthropy (HIP), a non-governmental group working in Latin America and the Caribbean. HIP publishes its report on human trafficking every four years.


One of the main forms of trafficking described was the sexual exploitation of women and girls. Men and boys, meanwhile, were forced to labor in the mining and construction sectors, while females were also pressed into domestic service. Children between the ages of five and 12 were victims of sexual abuse and pornography, as well as being forced to beg on behalf of others.


The people most vulnerable to trafficking included members of the LGBTQ community, young girls, the disabled, single women with children, Indigenous people and migrants, including those displaced internally or transiting the region, according to the report.


Mexico has one of the highest rates of human trafficking in the world. Between 2015 and 2021, more than 2,800 people were reported to be victims. And if the cases recorded through the first four months of this year continue apace, Mexico will log more than 650 victims in 2021, more than any of the last six years, according to the report.



The figures are almost certainly an undercount. Many cases go unreported for a variety of reasons, including a lack of confidence in authorities and fear of being killed for speaking out. Violence against women in Mexico has increased substantially alongside human trafficking in recent years, with a record 977 women killed in 2020. 


Mexico’s central region was the most affected by human trafficking, according to the report, but the southern states of Chiapas and Oaxaca were also among those with the highest trafficking rates. The report also highlighted the Puebla-Tlaxcala corridor, Mexico City and the Gulf state of Veracruz as being human trafficking hotspots.


Last year, victims of human trafficking were recorded in 126 municipalities and in 25 of Mexico’s 31 states, up from 18 states in 2017.


“Human trafficking has become even more complex with the current health crisis,” the report's authors concluded. The authors also noted that the growing presence of organized crime groups, ties between officials and criminal actors, rampant impunity and a lack of government attention have all created “greater conditions for human trafficking to increase.”


InSight Crime Analysis

Crime groups involved in human trafficking are taking advantage of pandemic conditions in Mexico in two ways.


First, the pandemic, which has pushed millions across Mexico into poverty, has “exacerbated many individuals' existing vulnerabilities to trafficking” and “increased the number of individuals vulnerable to exploitation,” according to the US State Department’s 2021 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report.


Second, Mexico has foundered in targeting traffickers.


“During COVID-19, there’s been a decline in interest and attention to human trafficking, which has allowed human trafficking groups to reorganize and operate with more freedom and less scrutiny from law enforcement,” Guadalupe Correa-Correa, an expert on human trafficking and organized crime in Mexico, told InSight Crime.


Migrant women and children traversing Mexico to reach the United States are particularly vulnerable to human trafficking.


Mexicans, meanwhile, fall prey to traffickers close to home. A 2019 analysis of human trafficking by the country’s National Human Rights Commission (Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos - CNDH) found that between 2012 and 2017, 84 percent of human trafficking victims were Mexican nationals, and more than half were trafficked in the same state they lived in.



To compound the issue, the Mexican government has – since 2014 – repeatedly “failed to fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking," according to US officials.


The HIP report added that there “does not appear to be a meeting point for treating the problem,” as human trafficking receives little attention on the national agenda. The absence of public policies only further generates confusion for civil society groups and others working to confront the problem, the report concluded.


“When you have a comprehensive strategy, you’re coordinating with different ministries, prosecutors and investigators, as well as with non-governmental organizations,” said Correa-Correa. “But in Mexico, there is no coordination because there’s no government strategy or victim-centered approach to combatting the issue.”


What's more, government officials have colluded with the leaders of trafficking groups or even taken part in trafficking crimes themselves. Corrupt immigration officials have falsified documents for criminal networks and accepted bribes to facilitate the trafficking of victims into Mexico, according to the CNDH report.


The State Department found that the Mexican government “did not prosecute or convict any officials for complicity in trafficking crimes” in 2020.


Even when trafficking rings are targeted, the leaders at the top of these networks often go untouched, while low-level members – who may also be trafficking victims themselves – frequently end up in prison, Correa-Correa said.

Tuesday, August 17, 2021

Thursday, August 12, 2021

The Next Generation of Criminal Groups Driving Violence in Mexico

 

The Next Generation of Criminal Groups Driving Violence in Mexico


Mexico's process of criminal fragmentation has been a slow burn. Many of the country's mightiest criminal groups have been unable to stay united due to internal strife, incursions from rivals or the arrests and killings of key leaders.


But while some powerhouses like the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación - CJNG) remain intact, smaller, hyper-violent and localized groups have become real national security threats. Many are splinters of old cartel structures, maintaining previous allegiances, while others were once dedicated oil thieves or drug transporters who gradually leveled up.


What's left is a volatile landscape where these groups can have an outsized influence. Below, InSight Crime profiles the most important newer criminal actors in Mexico.

La Línea
La Línea began life as an armed wing of the Juárez Cartel, intended to help the organization defend its border territories in and around Ciudad Juárez in the state of Chihuahua, right next to El Paso, Texas. The Juárez Cartel reportedly hired acting and former police to join La Línea, but the group has always had a strong degree of autonomy. InSight Crime has reported that this cell has operated independently since its inception, even taxing the Juárez and Sinaloa cartels to move their merchandise through the Juárez Valley.

La Línea has broadened its horizons, reportedly being involved in microtrafficking, synthetic drug trafficking, illegal logging and car theft in Chihuahua. The group has established an important presence in Ciudad Juárez, where it has access to routes to the US-Mexico border.

In February 2021, various media outlets reported that the Attorney General’s Office was aware of a meeting between members of the CJNG and La Línea, presumably to discuss an alliance to combat the Sinaloa Cartel. However, Chihuahua prosecutor César Augusto Peniche denied evidence of any alliance.

The violence employed by La Línea affects the neighboring states of Chihuahua and Sonora, where the group has clashed with Sinaloa Cartel cells like Gente Nueva in Chihuahua and the Salazar in Sonora. In fact, La Línea was one of the groups believed to be responsible for the infamous November 2019 massacre. Nine members of an American Mormon family in northwestern Sonora were killed.

On July 9, 2021, authorities in Chihuahua arrested the alleged leader of the La Línea, alias "H7,” on charges of homicide and participation in organized crime. Following his arrest, armed men attacked the police station in the Carachí municipality.


The Salazar
The Salazar is a family-based criminal network with links to the Sinaloa Cartel. The group is primarily involved in marijuana and heroin production and transporting drugs into Arizona. It also violently defends Sonora and Chihuahua states on the cartel’s behalf. The Salazar is believed to have started in Sonora in the early 1990s by Adán Salazar Zamorano, a confidant of Joaquín Guzmán, alias "El Chapo." However, it was not until 2005 that the violence perpetrated by the group gained significant attention from authorities.

The Salazar operate in Sonora and Chihuahua states, where the group's main rival, La Línea, also appears to operate. However, more recently, the group has also reportedly been involved in clashes with a Sinaloa Cartel cell known as the Rusos in Baja California state regarding control of the Mexicali corridor. This rivalry suggests that cells of the same umbrella organization still fight for territorial control.

The Salazar’s use of threats and violence has been directed at other criminal groups and toward journalists and public officials. Members of the Salazar are allegedly responsible for the 2017 murder of Miroslava Breach, a journalist who investigated the group, and the 2005 disappearance of journalist Alfredo Jiménez Mota. After the Salazar leader Del Villar Suárez was killed in August 2019, the group threatened the Sonora governor for not keeping her “promises” to the group, the details of which remain unclear. 

Tijuana New Generation Cartel
The Tijuana New Generation Cartel (Cartel Tijuana Nueva Generación - CTNG) is a Baja California-based criminal group that traffics heroin, cocaine, marijuana and synthetic drugs into the United States over the border crossing in Tijuana. The group emerged out of an alliance between the CJNG and remnants of the Tijuana Cartel, also known as the Arellano Félix Organization, to push back against the Sinaloa Cartel. 

The CTNG was founded as the Tijuana Cartel was becoming weaker and the CJNG was expanding. Today, it appears that the CTNG belongs to the CJNG as a local enforcement wing and drug trafficking logistics provider for the CJNG’s operations in Baja California. InSight Crime reported in 2016 that the CTNG was responsible for kidnapping, torturing and murdering rivals on the Baja California Peninsula. 

Tijuana's strategic location adjacent to the California border has contributed to significant turnover and the emergence of new alliances, armed wings and cartel sub-groups. The city is also home to one of Mexico’s newest criminal groups, the Cabos, a newer armed group within the CJNG that was spun off from the CTNG.

Grupo Sombra
Formed sometime around 2017, the Gulf Cartel splinter group known as the Grupo Sombra Special Forces (Fuerzas Especiales Grupo Sombra - FEGS) is an important criminal actor in the northern part of Veracruz but also has a presence in the central states of Hidalgo and San Luis Potosí. Grupo Sombra is purportedly dedicated to microtrafficking, human trafficking, migrant smuggling, murders for hire, kidnapping, extortion, and oil theft in these places.

The organization's members employ extremely violent tactics, often disseminating their actions via video or leaving the bodies of their victims on public roads. The group’s main rivals appear to be the Old School Zetas (Zetas Vieja Escuela) and CJNG, with the latter rapidly gaining ground in Veracruz. In fact, according to press reports, the group formed an alliance with the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel in 2019 as part of an effort to stop the CJNG's expansion in the central part of the country.

Grupo Sombra has sought the support of the local population by providing social aid. For example, the group was one of the various criminal actors that distributed goods during the first few months of the COVID-19 lockdowns and organized Children’s Day and Mother's Day celebrations in municipalities in the Huasteca region. In August 2020, federal forces in Veracruz detained the director of the Álamo de Temapache municipal police and six other officials for allegedly colluding with Grupo Sombra.  


Old School Zetas
A combination of the violent war that started in 2010 between the Zetas and Gulf Cartel led to the arrests and murders of leaders of both groups, and pressure by the state provoked the fragmentation of the two groups. Several splinter groups have emerged from the Zetas' divisions, including the Northeast Cartel, New Zeta Blood Cartel and the Old School Zetas (Zetas Vieja Escuela). 

The Old School Zetas were allegedly formed by José Guizar Valencia, alias "Z-43," and other dissidents. The group took the name "Old School" because they would stay true to the Zetas "original business" of drug trafficking, refraining from other predatory criminal activities, such as kidnapping, extortion and oil theft.

The Old School Zetas are currently concentrated in northern Veracruz with a sporadic presence in other states in the northern and eastern parts of the country, such as Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, Coahuila, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí and Quintana Roo. However, its main focus is on the northeastern border with the United States. It has participated in violent clashes against former allies - including the Northeast Cartel, Grupo Sombra and CJNG.

Z-43 was arrested in February 2018 in Mexico City. According to the news outlet Milenio, the group currently appears to be under the leadership of Antonio Salas Perea, alias “Chihuas,” who has allegedly formed alliances with Gulf Cartel splinter groups like the Ciclones.

The Talibanes
The Talibanes is an armed group from Tamaulipas, created by Iván Velázquez Caballero, alias “El Talibán” or “Z-50.” The former Zetas operator broke away from the organization in 2012 to challenge the leadership of brothers Miguel Ángel and Omar Treviño – also known as "Z-40" and "Z-42."

The organization primarily operates in the states of Zacatecas and San Luis Potosí, where Velázquez Caballero earned his nickname “El Talibán” in reference to his habit of using a machete to decapitate his enemies and extortion victims who didn't pay their quotas.

He was apprehended in 2012 and extradited to the United States the following year. Nevertheless, his organization continues to engage in microtrafficking, extortion, human trafficking and kidnapping, allegedly under the command of his son, Raúl, alias “El Talibancito.”

In March 2021, InSight Crime reported that the Talibanes were among the protagonists of the rising violence in Zacatecas state, caused by a fallout between groups looking to control this strategic territory. At the moment, the Talibanes are reportedly allied with the Sinaloa Cartel in Zacatecas, battling the CJNG for control of drug routes there.

The Talibanes were reportedly behind a failed assassination attempt against San Luis Potosí congressman Pedro Carrizales, several decapitated bodies left in front of municipal offices in Zacatecas and threats to several mayors and police officers in the state, according to Óscar Balderas, a journalist and expert on organized crime in Mexico.

The Viagras
The Viagras emerged after the fragmentation of the two largest criminal groups in the southern state of Michoacán, La Familia Michoacana and Knights Templar. Today, the group is part of the Cárteles Unidos, a criminal alliance in the crucial Tierra Caliente region, which seeks to stop the CJNG's incursion in the area.

Having operated as an independent cell from its inception, the Viagras are now one of the most dominant criminal factions in Michoacán's highlands. Even in its early years, it operated as an independent cell.

The group was allegedly founded in Huetamo, Michoacán, by seven brothers of the Sierra Santana family. But several of them have now been killed or arrested. According to press reports, the organization's current leader is Nicolás Sierra Santana, alias “El Gordo.”

According to a press release issued in 2014 by the former leader of the organization, Servando Gómez, alias “La Tuta,” the Viagras acted as the armed wing of the Knights Templar to combat the Guerreros Unidos over the last decade. Today, the Viagras’s activities are primarily concentrated on methamphetamine trafficking and extortion, with its most important rival being the CJNG.

The war between the Viagras and CJNG in Michoacán is one of the most intense in the country. The two organizations often face off in shootouts, establishing roadblocks to prevent the entry of the rival group or authorities in their territories – leaving the villagers captive. They flaunt their firepower by parading around the streets of Tierra Caliente with high-caliber weapons and armored vehicles. Over the course of this conflict, the Viagras have even attacked state security forces. In March, purported members of the organization fired on an Army helicopter after the arrest of El Gordo's son.

As part of the agglomeration Carteles Unidos, the Viagras have joined forces with former self-defense groups like the Cartel del Abuelo and other Michoacán Family splinter groups.

One of the Viagras’ main advantages in Tierra Caliente is the strong roots they have with the local population, beginning with the Sierra Santana family. The Viagras have regularly given out gifts and essential items in villages, claiming to be "protecting the population" from the CJNG. However, civilian self-defense groups have emerged in the area to oppose the Viagras.

The Rojos
The fragmentation of the Beltrán Leyva Organization (BLO) gave rise to the Rojos, an important cell in the central and southeastern part of Mexico, especially the state of Guerrero.

Although several of its leaders were arrested between 2019 and 2020, the organization has continued to survive and was recently listed by the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) as an active heroin trafficking group with links in the United States.

The organization's purported founder was Jesús Nava Romero, alias “El Rojo,” a BLO lieutenant that operated the drug trafficking routes from Guerrero to Morelos. Authorities killed El Rojo in 2009, and the organization's leadership was inherited by his nephew, Zenén Nava, and Santiago Mazari. Both men were arrested between July and August 2019. It remains unclear who assumed leadership in their absence.

The Rojos currently have an influence in the states of Morelos, Puebla, Mexico State and in the highlands of Guerrero – where opium gum is produced for heroin. The group has been accused of extortion, homicides, kidnappings, human trafficking and forced disappearances.

Their main rivals are other BLO splinter groups, particularly the Guerreros Unidos. Both groups have been linked to the disappearances of 43 student students in Ayotzinapa and high levels of violence in Guerrero and Morelos. A recent DEA report stated that the Guerreros Unidos are in an alliance with the CJNG.

The Rojos are also embroiled in a long-term feud with a local group, the Ardillos, which has controlled drug trafficking through parts of Guerrero for 20 years.


Monday, August 9, 2021

Narco History, El Padrino's Rise and Fall

 

Inside Mexico's Most Powerful Drug Cartel | Foreign Correspondent

Inside Mexico's Most Powerful Drug Cartel | Foreign Correspondent


Tens of thousands are missing, many more murdered. So why are Mexico’s violent drug cartels operating with impunity? We go inside the most powerful cartel to meet the footsoldiers. Corruption, they say, goes right to the top. Produced in collaboration with Ben Zand and Vice TV.


In Mexico’s Sinaloa state, violence has become a way of life.
Home to the country’s most powerful drug syndicate, the Sinaloa cartel, murders and disappearances are rife.

The police, meant to protect the population, are often the targets of violence. Over 500 officers were killed in Mexico last year.

They’re also often complicit, with corruption in the police force and government a major problem.In this shocking portrait of a country caught in the grip of organised crime, reporter Ben Zand takes us where few have gone – inside the Sinaloa cartel in the Sierra Madre mountains where he witnesses the group’s operations up close.

At their hidden base, the group grows poppies and marijuana for export, fends off outsiders with guns and bribes visiting police and security officers with money and women.


“The government is the one in charge” say the local leader. “The cartel is only as big as the government wants us to be.”

Commentator and writer Ioan Grillo believes that the police and military used to have the upper hand with the cartels but says that’s now changed.

“Some of the cartels have become much more powerful,” says Grillo. “[now] the cartel is actually bullying and controlling elements of the security forces.”

It’s the community who’s paying the price for corruption and impunity. 
Mirna Quiñones’ son disappeared suddenly 7 years ago. When police refused to help her, she set out to find him herself. 

She went on to set up the Trackers of El Fuerte group which helps parents looking for their children. In the last seven years of searching, they’ve uncovered over two hundred bodies.

“There is no justice. We all know that. I have been threatened by the municipal police here. The government and crime are united.”

Interior Minister, Olga Sánchez Cordero, concedes there is corruption. “The trials, and the investigations, are deficient”, she says. “Lawyers are threatened. Judges are threatened. That is just the reality.”

But she maintains the government is doing its best to investigate the cartels and to undermine their support base. 

Investigative journalist Anabel Hernández disagrees, saying she has little faith the government of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, elected two and half years ago, will tackle the problem.

“He promised to do something different but….it’s just the same. Nothing changed. In some parts it's worse."

About Foreign Correspondent: 
Foreign Correspondent is the prime-time international public affairs program on Australia's national broadcaster, ABC-TV. We produce half-hour duration in-depth reports for broadcast across the ABC's television channels and digital platforms. Since 1992, our teams have journeyed to more than 170 countries to report on war, natural calamity and social and political upheaval – through the eyes of the people at the heart of it all. 

Contributions may be removed if they violate ABC’s Online Terms of Use http://www.abc.net.au/conditions.htm (Section 3). This is an official Australian Broadcasting  

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M2IQuXbExjU


Documents Reveal Attempts to Curb Guatemala's Anti-Corruption Unit

 

Documents Reveal Attempts to Curb Guatemala's Anti-Corruption Unit


Before the firing of Juan Francisco Sandoval, Guatemala’s top anti-corruption prosecutor, Attorney General Consuelo Porras pressured him to curtail investigations while his unit probed accusations of corruption in Porras' office.


According to documents published by newspaper elPeriódico, Porras, who dismissed Sandoval July 23, had sought to influence investigations conducted by the country’s Special Prosecutor’s Office Against Impunity (Fiscalía Especial contra la Impunidad – FECI). Her memos, acquired by the newspaper, touch on investigations into high-level court appointments and officials in the inner circle of President Alejandro Giammattei. Meanwhile, a lawyer had testified to the FECI that an advisor in the Attorney General's Office offered to transfer a case of his away from the unit for $9,000.


The new documents appear to corroborate accusations made by Sandoval after his firing: that his former boss repeatedly meddled in major investigations and that information about sensitive cases was leaked from the Attorney General's Office.

In the midst of nationwide protests demanding Porras' resignation and calls from the US State Department to have Sandoval reinstated, Porras is reshuffling the FECI, leaving the heralded anti-corruption unit in turmoil.


Pushback From Porras

In a press conference held hours after his dismissal, Sandoval said that Porras had on multiple occasions instructed FECI staff to target certain people during an investigation into influence peddling in the appointment of judges to Guatemala’s high courts.


His comments coincide with two internal memos that Porras sent to Sandoval in March, published by elPeriódico. In the first, Porras questioned Sandoval over FECI’s failure to arrest Estuardo Gálvez, the former dean of Guatemala’s San Carlos University and an influential figure in the court selection process. Sandoval claimed that Porras insisted on Gálvez's arrest, despite being told that FECI did not yet have a strong enough case. In February, the Attorney General's Office put out a warrant for Gálvez's arrest on charges of influence peddling, violating the constitution and illicit association. Seven other people were also charged in the case.


In the same memo, Porras questioned FECI's expansion of the case to include others besides Gálvez. One of these was current Constitutional Court justice Nester Vásquez, who Porras had told FECI prosecutors not to investigate, Sandoval said after his firing. At that time, Vázquez was a Supreme Court justice and had been nominated for a spot on the Constitutional Court.


Porras also pushed back when FECI began probing President Alejandro Giammattei’s former private secretary, Leyla Lemus. At the time, FECI was reportedly investigating an alleged plot to overthrow the former president of Guatemala's Social Security Institute (Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social – IGSS). Prosecutors sent a request to Giammattei's presidential office for information, including from Lemus.


In a document sent out by Porras’ office referencing the case, also published by elPeriódico, Porras told Sandoval’s anti-impunity office to act “respectfully and cordially” when dealing with presidential matters, “in line with the high office held by the president.” The case was eventually transferred away from FECI to another branch of the Attorney General's Office.


Sandoval, who fled the country after his dismissal and is in the United States, told InSight Crime that Porras' resistance to certain investigations began in 2018 and then gradually increased as she gained the president's confidence.


"That coincided with internal pressures within the Attorney General's Office over documents in which they thought we were asking for information related to people close to the president," Sandoval said.


Cash for Escaping FECI 'Hell'

In a separate report from the Porras memos, elPeriódico published testimony given to FECI by a lawyer who said an assistant in Porras’ office offered to transfer cases away from certain branches of the Attorney General’s Office, including FECI, in exchange for cash.


Marco Alveño Hernández told FECI about discussions with Claudia Paola Mansilla Figueroa, who confirmed that his client was involved in a FECI case and demanded $9,000 to transfer the case to another unit. Mansilla Figueroa is an assistant to Héctor Anibal de León Velasco, an advisor of Porras' in the Attorney General's Office. Alveño Hernández handed $4,500 in cash to Mansilla Figueroa on behalf of his client, but the case was never transferred.


Mansilla Figueroa also sent a memo to Alveño Hernández. In it, she referred to a "formula" for successfully transferring cases between units by claiming collusion among prosecutors and judges, according to evidence submitted to FECI.


Further evidence provided by Alveño Hernández includes chats in which Mansilla Figueroa reveals sensitive information related to FECI investigations, including the one concerning appointments to the top courts. The Attorney General's Office advisor also provided Alveño Hernández with a list of individuals involved in FECI cases, according to his testimony. In one chat between the pair, Mansilla Figueroa equates being investigated by FECI with “falling into hell.”


In a statement, the Attorney General’s Office said it would analyze the authenticity of Alveño Hernández's claims. Speaking on local radio, Porras said that the lawyer was looking to guarantee impunity for himself, according to elPeriódico.


After confirming that the testimony reported by elPeriódico was authentic, Alveño Hernández left the country, telling the Associated Press he feared for his life and that of his family.


The Giammattei Connection

In his testimony, Alveño Hernández also alleged that Édgar Barquín, an unofficial economic advisor to President Giammattei and the former head of Guatemala’s national bank, was tipped off about an investigation into him.


Alveño Hernández, who was Barquín's lawyer at the time, said he coordinated with Mansilla Figueroa to have the Attorney General’s Office give the green light to have the case transferred from the FECI. Mansilla Figueroa asked for a total of 50,000 quetzales (approximately $6,500) in cash for the favor, which Alveño Hernández delivered in two installments, according to the testimony.


In 2019, Giammattei admitted to attending meetings with Barquín and seeking economic advice, despite the latter having been found guilty of influence peddling in a money laundering case earlier that year. But the president distanced himself from Barquín following Alveño Hernández's revelations, saying "[Barquín] doesn't work for the state nor is he a government advisor."


Sandoval told InSight Crime that there are "solid elements" to suggest that Giammattei pressured the Attorney General to fire him, citing Porras' efforts to transfer cases linked to the president's administration away from FECI and target investigators from the anti-impunity unit with administrative sanctions.


Porras’ Reshuffle

In the wake of Sandoval’s exit, Porras has continued to shake up the Attorney General’s Office. Days after replacing Sandoval with long-time state prosecutor Carla Isidra Valenzuela Elías, Porras removed her and named José Rafael Curruchiche as the new head of FECI.


Curruchiche, the former head of the electoral crimes unit within the Attorney General’s Office, is currently involved in a controversial investigation targeting two high-profile officials who worked on major corruption cases for the defunct International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala — CICIG), the United Nations-backed body that worked with the FECI on prosecutions of powerful businessmen, organized crime figures and politicians, including presidents.


In his previous role, Curruchiche was the target of complaints about his alleged mishandling of a corruption probe into the campaign finances of former President Jimmy Morales' political party, elPeriódico reported.


Sandoval said to expect "nothing good" from Curruchiche's appointment. He told InSight Crime that Curruchiche's actions have consistently aligned with certain political factions implicated in major corruption cases and that, as a state prosecutor, he attempted to protect businesspeople who had illegally financed Morales' campaign.


"Our expectation is that [FECI] cases won't advance," Sandoval said. "On the contrary, there will be actions taken against those who worked for the CICIG."

Are El Koki and His Gang Members No Longer Safe in Venezuela?

 

Are El Koki and His Gang Members No Longer Safe in Venezuela?


Police in Venezuela have killed a notorious gang leader while others are reportedly hiding in Colombia, raising questions about the state of one of Caracas’ most powerful criminal structures and its leader, El Koki.  


On August 4, around 50 agents of Venezuela’s Special Actions Forces (Fuerzas de Acciones Especiales – FAES) stormed a residential block in Sucre municipality of Miranda state, where they shot and killed Leonardo José Polanco Angulo, alias “Loco Leo,” the leader of a gang controlling Caracas’ El Valle neighborhood. Loco Leo is a key ally of Carlos Luis Revete, alias “El Koki,” who has long been considered Caracas’ most powerful gang leader.



The shock offensive took place mere days after Interpol Venezuela designated Loco Leo as the country’s second most wanted criminal. FAES commander Miguel Domínguez later reported on Twitter that Polanco Angulo’s mother, wife and sister had been detained in the operation.


The arrests appear to be part of a broader strategy to go after people close to gang leaders. El Koki’s former partner was arrested, as were two relatives of his lieutenant Carlos Calderón Martínez, alias “El Vampi.” Venezuelan media reported that Loco Leo was located by monitoring and triangulating cell phone calls, including those of his family members.


Reports have also emerged that the group’s leaders have fled across the border into the Colombian department of Norte de Santander, though their presence in the region is based on unconfirmed reports from Colombian and Venezuelan police.


InSight Crime Analysis

The death of Loco Leo is a victory for President Nicolás Maduro in his recent offensive against El Koki’s gang members, who no longer feel safe in Caracas.


El Koki’s gang has been battling with authorities since June, when the gang invaded La Vega, a neighborhood of 120,000 people to the southwest of the gang’s stronghold of Cota 905.


The warring came to a head when El Koki’s gunmen opened fire on the central police and intelligence service headquarters in Caracas known as El Helicoide. The brazen July 7 shooting was apparently retaliation for Loco Leo being wounded in a police shootout.


Venezuela’s government responded in full force to the gunfire days later. Some 800 troops raided Cota 905, conducting house-to-house searches amid shootouts with gang members.


Since then, authorities have established checkpoints all across the sprawling hillside district.


Loco Leo’s killing is now another blow to the group, and other leaders appear to be on the run. El Vampi is reported to be holed up in the Colombian border city of Cucutá.


El Koki also has been reported in the city, though evidence to support the claim he is there to launder money and establish criminal connections is thin. Though Venezuelan criminal groups, such as the Tren de Aragua gang, have established themselves in the lawless Colombian frontier with Venezuela, the region often serves as a hideout for gang leaders, such as the late Willy Meléan who was shot dead in Santander in November 2020.


If El Koki is in Cúcuta, it’s most likely because he no longer feels safe in his Caracas stronghold. In the last month, 42 of his men have been arrested, while dozens of others have been killed.


Venezuelan authorities are not likely to let him reclaim Cota 905 soon. El Koki’s attack on Caracas’ central police station humiliated the Venezuelan government, which is facing regional elections in November this year, and needs to appear strong. Carmen Meléndez, Venezuela’s Minister of Justice and Peace, directed the July 8 police invasion of the Cota 905 neighborhood, and she will participate in the August 8 primaries for the ruling government party to stand as its mayoral candidate for Caracas’ Libertador municipality in the November elections. She has loudly lauded the government crackdown.


What happens after the elections may indicate where the gang and El Koki stand with Maduro. The Venezuelan government has a history of subduing Caracas’ gangs to punish leaders who offend. Such was the case with the 2020 crackdown on the Wilexis gang when it apparently sided with the Venezuelan opposition.


The government may decide El Koki and his gang have gained too much notoriety and invite one of the militant pro-government colectivos in their stead.

Saturday, August 7, 2021

Mexican Growers Arm Against Cartels

 


Mexican growers arm against cartels


American growers certainly face many challenges. But they can be grateful for the fact that they usually don’t have to face down organized crime.


Mexican growers aren’t as lucky. In the state of Michoacán, avocado and blackberry growers have taken up arms to prevent extortion, murder, and kidnapping by drug cartels.


Some 3,000 farmers and farm hands in the communities of Salvador Escalante, Ario de Rosales, Nuevo Urecho, and Taretán have taken up arms in recent months to fight back against the cartels, reports Mexico News Daily.


“It’s cheaper to buy a rifle than to pay extortion,” said one member. The cartels have been demanding a “protection fee” of 50,000 pesos (approximately $2,500) per hectare.



The armed self-protection group, called Pueblos Unidos (“united communities”) has been operating for eight months. It uses checkpoints and high-powered weapons to keep out cartel members. “We had to follow them wherever they were,” said one member. “We combed the hills, walking—something that the government hasn’t done. We came together in groups of 20 to 60 to comb the hills, and we frightened them away.”


Michoacán is the only Mexican state licensed to sell avocados in the United States, and also one of the states with the most violence.


It is centrally located, so that it is ideal for moving things across the country. It also has coastal access, making it attractive to the drug trade.


Last week, Mexico News Daily reported three roadblocks in the state: one operated by Pueblos Unidos, the others by a criminal group (Narco-blockades, clashes in Michoacán as battles extend beyond Aguililla.


These self-defense units, known as autodefensas, were formed because Mexican government forces either weren’t able to suppress the cartels or were actually colluding with them, as in the Michoacán community of Buenavista.


The Mexico News Daily quoted José Segura, a Catholic priest: “Sadly, the National Guard is on the outskirts of the town, at the entrance points, making sure that nobody disrupts the witch hunt of the Cárteles Unidos. Instead of helping the population, they’re looking after those who are now tormenting the people.”


Such units are not exactly a vote of confidence for the nation’s federal government, so it’s not surprising that Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador (popularly known as AMLO) has objected to them. Previous administrations had cracked down on autodefensas. (Background on this issue here).


Despite efforts by the Mexican government, and over $3 billion in U.S. aid to combat drug trafficking, the cartels have increased control over our neighbor to the south. Although on the map Mexico looks like a typical nation-state, the government’s control over much of its territory is limited or, perhaps, nonexistent.


The U.S. State Department has recommended that Americans avoid travel to Michoacán (along with Colima, Guerrero, Sinaloa, and Tamaulipas) because of crime and kidnapping.


Of course, the powerful drug cartels, which are increasingly involving themselves in other activities, would hardly exist without the enormous appetite for illegal drugs in the United States.


So far, cartel activity has not significantly affected exports of avocados and other produce from Mexico to the United States. But it serves as a reminder that commerce, not to mention public order, cannot be taken for granted without civil control.

Friday, August 6, 2021

Why is Veracruz Mexico's Most Dangerous State for Political Murders?

 Why is Veracruz Mexico's Most Dangerous State for Political Murders?


Running for office in Mexico means risking one's life. Days away from local elections on June 6, at least 89 political candidates had been killed during the current campaign.


The 2021 election cycle has been the most dangerous in recent years, with 782 acts of violence against incumbents and challengers alike, edging out the 774 violent acts recorded in 2018, according to a regularly updated report on political violence in Mexico by risk analysis group, Etellekt.


The eastern state
of Veracruz has been at the center of attacks on politicians. Since September, it has seen 117 acts of violence, including 16 politicians murdered, about one-fifth of the total killings nationwide, despite only being the country's eighth-most violent state in terms of overall homicides. Oaxaca had the second-highest number of attacks at 68, just over half the amount in Veracruz.


In this article, InSight Crime breaks down why Veracruz has been particularly vulnerable to attempts to intimidate or kill politicians, whether by organized crime or by other interests.


The Invisible Hand of the CJNG

On May 16, the body of José Alfredo Gaspar Gutiérrez was found in a garbage dump. He had been kidnapped three days earlier. He appeared to have been tortured.


Gutiérrez had been campaigning to become mayor of Misantla, a town of around 30,000 people in central Veracruz. The town is also a strategic location for drug trafficking and production, just a short drive from the state capital Xalapa, and close to highways heading north towards Tampico and the US border.


The town is controlled by the Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación – CJNG), which has a production facility there for manufacturing methamphetamine, according to an investigation by Televisa.


From there, the drugs are sent either to the Port of Veracruz to be sold abroad or to the United States.


The CJNG appears to care deeply about keeping hold of Misantla. After three of its members were reportedly killed there by police in March 2019, the group organized blockades along the important Córdoba-Veracruz highway, burning trucks and opening fire on police, killing at least one.


The town was hard-won. Misantla was formerly an important operational center for the Zetas, before the group was violently ousted from Veracruz by the CJNG.

While nobody has claimed responsibility for the murder of Gutiérrez, a number of murders of politicians this year have taken place in towns the group controls.


In March, mayoral candidate José Melquiades Vázquez Lucas was killed outside a municipal building in La Perla. The state governor blamed the murder on organized crime. The CJNG has a comfortable grip on La Perla, even distributing food parcels there during the COVID-19 pandemic.


In February, former Cosoleacaque mayor Gladys Merlín and her daughter, Carla Enríquez Merlín, who was planning to run for office in the town, were shot dead at their home. Again, the area has been a regular operating base for the CJNG.


And there is little fear of retribution. Much of the violence has involved surprise attacks by masked gunmen driving cars and motorcycles, who shoot the politicians in broad daylight.


It is difficult to blame the CJNG alone for these actions. Veracruz has been a battleground state in recent years, with Mexico's most powerful cartel being challenged by the Zetas Vieja Escuela (Old School Zetas), a splinter group of the Zetas trying to reclaim their former territory.


Central and southern Veracruz, where the CJNG and Zetas Vieja Escuela have been fighting for control, account for the overwhelming majority of political murders. InSight Crime found that, of the political candidates and incumbents killed in Veracruz since 2019, all were murdered in towns with either a direct recorded presence of the CJNG or close to areas they control.


Better Cooperative than Dead

Of course, as shown by the Etellekt report, most candidates are not killed but threatened. One candidate, Onán Hernández López, said he received messages telling him to get out of the race. In other municipalities, masked men have shot up candidates’ houses.


“Organized crime has had a decisive influence on the electoral process through violence and threats, to the extent that many candidates have stopped campaigning or dropped out,” the Democratic Revolution Party (Partido de la Revolución Democrática – PRD) said in a May statement.


And for those that do stay in the race, there are clear benefits to cooperating with criminal groups instead of opposing them. Authorities have long warned about the political influence the CJNG and other criminal groups wield in Veracruz.


"Today, the large part [of Veracruz] is under the control of the CJNG. ... They have all the police commanders at their disposal and obviously, this structure is going to finance candidates," said crime researcher Ricardo Ravelo in an interview with Mexican media last April.


While not naming any specific officials, human rights groups and journalists have pointed to the local governments in Coatzacoalcos, Papantla, Poza Rica, Las Choapas, Tezonapa and Córdoba as having ties to the CJNG and groups linked to the Zetas.


State governor Cuitláhuac García said steps are being taken to improve security, including the beefing up of surveillance in jurisdictions holding elections. But there are 212 mayoral seats up for grabs in Veracruz this midterm, in addition to 50 deputies, and it is proving nearly impossible to protect everyone.


Indeed, less than a week after García Jiménez spoke out about the violence, masked men in Chalma ambushed mayoral candidate Fernando Argüelles, beating him so badly that he and his driver had to be sent to the hospital.


All Roads Lead to Veracruz

When Mexican criminal groups target political candidates, they are usually trying to bully them into working together or, if that fails, remove them from the race. Although this is happening to some extent in every state across the country, Veracruz is particularly conducive to it for a few different reasons.


First, the state is an especially attractive place geographically to set up a criminal operation. It touches seven other states, connecting southern Mexico with Tamaulipas, the final stopping point before drugs, contraband and migrants enter the United States. And its seaports bring in international shipments of legal goods, as well as precursor chemicals for synthetic drug production. 


Second, criminal groups and politicians often make backdoor agreements in order to operate. The problem dates back to at least the early 2000s, when then-Governor Fidel Herrera’s administration allowed a criminal group that would eventually become the Zetas to enter the state if it agreed to contribute to certain candidates' campaigns.


His successor, Javier Duarte, helped strike further deals with the Zetas and obstructed numerous investigations into homicides and kidnappings. Duarte, who would go onto become a notorious fugitive, oversaw a systematic teardown of Veracruz's government, turning it into a criminal operation that embezzled millions of dollars.


SEE ALSO: Veracruz: Report Unveils Mexico's 'State of Terror'


Subsequent governors have tried to get a handle on corruption, even creating a "Truth Commission" to document the crimes committed during the Herrera and Duarte eras, while also increasing accountability for future governments. But it has failed to root out the problem at the local level, which continues to see municipal police and other officials working closely with criminal groups. That might explain why most of the political violence has involved municipal candidates. Criminal groups need to make sure that the person who wins office will be willing to uphold the status quo.


Third, years of corruption have helped fuel political fragmentation, making it easier for criminal groups to prey on weak governments, and for governments to solicit the help of criminal groups.


Veracruz was long a stronghold for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional – PRI). But since Duarte’s ouster in 2016, the state governor’s office has cycled from PRI to the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional – PAN) to Morena. The parties have become increasingly unwilling to work across the aisle, which means different parts of the government have become fragmented and aren’t always coordinating their efforts against organized crime.


In 2016, even though the state was suffering from a budget crisis partly caused by Duarte’s embezzlement, the federal government declined to provide it a bailout, saying that the state was responsible for its own financial situation. A lot of that money could have replaced the millions of dollars that Duarte stole from municipal governments that criminal groups are trying to intimidate today.


Worse, this political in-fighting is likely leading to more attacks on candidates.


Too Easy to Always Blame Narcos

However, while the analysis of political murders in Veracruz points to the strong involvement of the CJNG, that does not tell the whole story.


Of the 16 murders in Veracruz registered by Etellekt, 11 were from opposition parties to the state government. Eight were challengers, not incumbents, and did not hold any political office when they were killed.


In a new project launched in June 2021, entitled "Elections & Violence in Mexico," Noria Research seeks to better understand the motives behind political violence. The project introduction states that most studies explain electoral and political violence only "through a criminal incentive model," leaving aside "the active or passive participation, protection, collaboration or patronage from politicians, ... armed forces, as well as from other private or public actors."


It is difficult to pinpoint which Veracruz murders were committed exclusively by criminal groups or which may have had the involvement of local officials.


But some of those killed had deep family connections with Veracruz politics, spanning over different decades, administrations and political parties. Numerous theories have emerged concerning the murders last February of Gladys Merlín Castro, former mayor of Cosoleacaque, and her daughter, Carla Enríquez Merlín, who was considering entering the local mayoral race.


The Merlín Alor family had held power and influence over Cosoleacaque in southern Veracruz for decades, holding key political positions, running the local ranchers' union and owning key businesses. Heliodoro Merlín Alor, the father and grandfather of the two victims, was described as a cacique (chieftain) who ran a group known as “La Banda de los Merlín" (The Merlín Gang). The family has withstood a series of attempted murders and kidnappings in the past.


Historically, "the main actors in electoral violence were the professionals, the street-fighters, policemen [above all the municipal ones], union thugs, pistoleros [gunmen] and soldiers. Their role was to guarantee the victory of the favored candidate," wrote Paul Gillingham in a recent Noria Research summary of political violence in Mexico.