Narcos: Mexico Diego Luna & Michael Pena on the complexities and modern parallels in Season 1

 

Diego Luna & Michael Pena are interviewed for the Netflix American drug crime TV series Narcos Mexico, created by Carlo Bernard and Doug Miro. It was originally set to be series 4 of Narcos, but has been set up as a companion/sister show focusing on an undercover investigation into the illegal drug trade in Mexico rather than the Pablo Escobar cartel in Columbia. The series stars Ant-Man’s Michael Peña and Star Wars Rogue One’s Diego Luna, Matt Letscher, Tenoch Huerta, Joaquín Cosío, Teresa Ruiz, Alyssa Diaz, and José María Yazpik. They talk about binge-watching, Game of Thrones, Stranger Things and how they establish the world of Narcos. They also talk about this being a new beginning and how this new series fits in the Narcos timeline. Deigo Luna talks about the complexities of the situation - the politicians, the police and the military on both sides of the border - affect the world we're living in today. Pena talks about the legacy of 'the mob' and how we're seeing a return to that in the modern world - notably Donald Trump's wall. The series goes into depth about the nuances of the problems concerning the drugs trade and the health issues. Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1iEk7w9sf78

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Mexico's Geoduck Clams Latest Casualty of Asian Demand

Mexican geoduck clam populations are suffering as legal harvests are threatened by rampant poaching, which has driven the species onto the endangered species list.

The legal geoduck clam industry is steadily being pushed out by poachers who operate with little fear of repercussion, according to La Jornada, quoting Mexico’s chamber of commerce for fisheries (Canainpesca). At the same time, Mexican fishing authorities assert that the clam’s status as a luxury seafood dish in Asian markets is fueling a perhaps irreversible decline.

Sergio Guevara Escamilla, Canainpesca’s representative in the northwestern state of Baja California, blamed “a network of corruption” threatening the livelihoods of hundreds of families to fuel the demand for this seafood dish in Asian markets.

To curb exploitation, the Mexican government announced temporary moratoriums on fishing the clams every year. These ran from April 16-30, 2021, and will take place from January 25 to April 30 in the years to come.

Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing has ravaged northwestern Mexico, making the clam one of the most threatened marine species in the region.

InSight Crime Analysis

While numerous other marine species in Mexico have been threatened, the speed at which the geoduck clam has been overexploited is alarming. First discovered in the Gulf of California in the 1990s, the clam’s harvesting regulation has only been in place since 2007.

Its price in Mexico can reach $40 a kilogram and a single geoduck clam can fetch as high as $300 in high-end restaurants in China, according to the BBC. It is also legally produced in the United States and China, with 90 percent of clams going to China.

The same goes for Mexico. “More than 90 percent of the production is exported to Asia, where introducers have no qualms about receiving the illegal product, especially at a price lower than the market price,” Guevara Escamilla told La Jornada.  

The Mexican navy has worked to stem the flow of illegally sourced clams to international markets, making regular seizures of geoduck clams alongside sea cucumbers, lobsters, abalone and other seafood.

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Jalisco Cartel Sets Off Alarm Bells Along Mexico-Guatemala Border

 

Jalisco Cartel Sets Off Alarm Bells Along Mexico-Guatemala Border

The Jalisco Cartel New Generation, which has rapidly expanded to become Mexico's greatest criminal threat, may now be spreading its influence in a new area: the border with Guatemala.

Much of the border area is a no-man's-land, where traffickers can easily avoid the police. A recent wave of violence began as a response by Mexican drug gangs after some of their product was allegedly stolen in Guatemala. Guatemalan authorities have displayed caution, but the situation is reminiscent of the days when Los Zetas entered Guatemala.

"This message goes out to [a] crooked and thieving policeman," was the introduction at the start of an edited video circulating on social media on September 7.

The video message was recorded by a subject with their face covered by a ski mask. The man introduced himself as a member of a Mexican cartel and accused, by name, a Guatemalan police inspector and three officers of stealing a drug shipment between the municipalities of Raxruhá and Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, near the country's border with Mexico.

"On May 12, they stole from the boss," continued the subject, speaking with a notable Mexican accent and surrounded by three men wielding assault rifles, their faces also covered.

"We are already going after you [...]; you have 24 hours to return everything. If not, we are going to kill you, we will even kill your children […] This is the last chance we will give you ... we are not playing, we have already cleaned the town of La Mesilla. ... Listen closely, no one messes with Señor Nemesio's people. These items belong to someone and the owner is the Jalisco Cartel New Generation [Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación - CJNG].”

“Señor Nemesio,” or Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, alias “El Mencho,” is the leader of the CJNG. While the group began life in the northwest of the country, it is now engaged in a fight with the Sinaloa Cartel for control of the state of Chiapas along the Guatemalan border. This fight echoes other clashes between the two Mexican groups across the country.

*This investigation was carried out by El Faro. It has been edited for clarity and reprinted with permission. It does not necessarily reflect the views of InSight Crime. Read the original in Spanish here. 

These threats are similar to the last time drug traffickers got even with Guatemalan police over stolen money or drugs in June 2013, when eight agents and an inspector from the substation in Salcajá, Quetzaltenango (western Guatemala), were murdered. Eduardo Villatoro Cano, alias "Guayo Cano," of the Zetas, was found to be the intellectual author of the murders.

Now, all signs indicate that a similar vendetta is underway.

Just two months after Nentón residents reported the first attack by a Mexican armed group in Huehuetenango, Guatemala, a shooting occurred on August 12 on the other side of the border, in Chiapas. Photo: El Faro.

A Looming Threat

In the video, the masked man claimed to have already established order in La Mesilla, a Guatemalan town right on the Mexican border, seemingly claiming responsibility for a series of armed attacks there in July and August.

Signs of a new organized crime vendetta began on June 12, when media reported a checkpoint on the road between Nentón in Guatemala and Comitán in Mexico.

Press reports indicated that residents of Nentón, another border town, saw men with ski masks and assault rifles inspecting vehicles for migrants, firearms or drugs on the Guatemalan side of the border.

El Faro contacted the Guatemalan Defense Ministry, but its spokesman, Colonel Rubén Téllez, claimed that the checkpoint was on the Mexico side of the border.

"There was no confirmation. [No one] came forward and said, 'yes, they stopped me and asked me for this,'" said Téllez, who added that military and police patrols were sent to reinforce the border.

However, Téllez stated that while it's typical to see organized crime groups moving along the border, a new armed group had recently started entering and leaving Guatemala regularly.

Since June, the violent acts occurring near the border suggest that this armed group is, or could be related to, the CJNG, as the man in the video claims.

This has caused alarm among local towns because, while the area is home to frequent drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, contraband and more, there has not been any large-scale violence in this part of Guatemala in 2020. Huehuetenango, the department along the border where these attacks were reported, has one of the lowest homicide rates in Guatemala.

On July 28, a shootout took place along a highway in Chiapas, mere kilometers from the border. Mexican authorities found at least 300 shell casings of various calibers and six abandoned vehicles. One was on fire, the rest had bullet holes and Guatemalan license plates.

On July 31, a voice message from an unidentified source circulated in Mexico and Guatemala on social media. Despite claiming no criminal affiliation, it warned to "please step aside ... because we are entering Guatemala, and there will be bloodshed. You messed with our people, now deal with it. Whoever is on the street, we will obliterate them. ... We won't say what day, but it is approaching. We are already there. Chamic, Comalapa, La Mesilla, Cuauhtémoc, all those places we are going to come by shooting.”

A former investigator for Guatemala's Attorney General's Office, who knows about the situation on the border but asked to remain anonymous, told El Faro that drug and contraband trafficking at the border happen with help from authorities.

"There are always at least two Guatemalan police officers collecting tax on those who bring merchandise across," said a merchant in the area that had witnessed these transactions. "The Army is there. If you go, you see them. It is uncommon for Mexicans to enter Guatemala, and if they enter, they are known to be narcos [who come] to buy and transport [drugs]."

On August 12, there was another shootout in Mexico on the highway between Ciudad Cuauhtémoc and Potrerillo in Chiapas, 10 minutes from Guatemala. The outcome: a minibus and a pickup truck were left in flames on the side of the highway. The pickup had Guatemalan license plates. Press reports cited Mexican authorities as saying that the shootout took place between Mexican and Guatemalan drug traffickers and that it extended inside Guatemala in the town of Vueltamina. Again, the Army denied any violence inside Guatemala and that soldiers had verified the claim.

The list grows longer. On August 16, Mexican authorities claimed to have arrested 48 CJNG members in Chiapas. On August 24, two people were shot dead on board a minibus in La Democracia, a town in Huehuetenango just 15 kilometers from the border with Mexico. Then just two weeks later, on September 7, came the video with the CJNG claiming to have already cleaned up La Mesilla.

Reactions and Background

The government spokesman, Castillo, told El Faro that authorities have not ruled out that the purpose of the video may have been to destabilize "the [government's] good results in the fight against drug trafficking."

By early September, Guatemala had arrested 36 people wanted for extradition to the United States, seized almost six tons of cocaine and stopped dozens of drug planes in 2021, Castillo stated.

But the CJNG video harks back to the very real Mexican cartel incursions into Guatemala. The municipality of Raxruhá, where police were accused of stealing a CJNG drug shipment, was an important cocaine transit point for the Zetas, which maintained a strong presence in Guatemala between 2008 and 2013.

They lost ground in the country as they splintered, and in recent years the CJNG has begun to take over drug trafficking spots once controlled by the Zetas.

The history of police corruption in the region is also a real problem. Carlos Menocal, a former interior minister, revealed that the police officers who made the seizure in Raxruhá had their phone numbers leaked and began to receive death threats.

In 2017, an anti-drug trafficking investigator stated that drug traffickers had contacts in all police stations. Stopping short of saying that all police officers were corrupt, he revealed that these contacts were substantial enough to prevent key seizures and arrests. Despite this, the number of police prosecutions for drug-related offenses remains very low.

What the Facts Tell Us

Gerson Alegría, the current head of Guatemala's anti-drug prosecutor's office, told El Faro that the outbreaks of violence along the border shared by Huehuetenango and Chiapas may be due to poor negotiations between drug trafficking groups.

"When the straw breaks the camel's back, violence is unleashed," said the prosecutor.

That said, spikes in violence on the Guatemalan side are unusual.

The situation at the Mexico-Guatemala border is highly different from the country's borders with Honduras and El Salvador, where the prevalence of smaller drug gangs has made that area the most murderous in Guatemala.

Over the last 15 years, shootings and multiple homicides have been rare in Huehuetenango. The most famous outbreak of violence was the Agua Zarca massacre in November 2008, when a firefight between the Zetas and the Huistas, a local group associated with the Sinaloa Cartel, left 19 dead.

The Huistas remain the dominant criminal structure in Huehuetenango. Authorities had not arrested any Huista since 2012 until two arrests in 2021 showed that they remain active.

Beyond Drug Trafficking

Another investigator for the Attorney General's office also stated that collusion at the Mexico-Guatemala border between authorities and criminal groups extends beyond drug trafficking.

For instance, he claimed that police are warned when buses loaded with migrants are headed to Huehuetenango to stop them and demand money to let them travel to the border. This is a common practice.

In 2019, a journalist for El Faro traveled pretending to be a migrant and was assaulted by police twice before reaching the border.

Disputes over the spoil also provoke violence against police officers. In July, two agents investigating the disappearance of a minor in the remote area of Huehuetenango were beaten by five alleged coyotes (human smugglers).

Another link is that drug trafficking groups are allegedly also taking in human smuggling. On August 27, Guatemalan police in the border department of Petén warned that they were on alert for "possible members of Mexican cartels" that intended to attack migrants, headquarters and immigration checkpoints in Guatemala.

Burning vehicles have frequently been left behind after shootouts on both sides of the Mexico-Guatemala border. Photo: El Faro.

The investigator claimed the attacks across the border, especially those where minibuses were torched on August 12 and 24, could be linked to human smuggling. Government sources stated that two bodies of Salvadoran nationals were found next to the minibus in the August 24 attack.

An investigation is underway to establish if the attackers of the minibus were Mexican and if they crossed the border.

"There are many news reports about the arrival of the Jalisco Cartel in Chiapas. Some say they are being hit hard in Jalisco and are dabbling in businesses outside drug trafficking to avoid attracting the attention of the DEA [US Drug Enforcement Administration]," Raúl Benítez Manaut, an investigator with Mexico's National Autonomous University, told El Faro.

"The Zetas tried to do this years ago. It is now suspected the CJNG intends to do the same," he added.

In the meantime, the Guatemalan government continues to downplay the importance of events at the border. But the violence has not gone down, and the indicators suggest the CJNG may well be responsible.

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Bomb Threats: Mexico's Crime Groups Turn to Explosives

 

Bomb Threats: Mexico's Crime Groups Turn to Explosives

 package bomb that killed a restaurateur and his manager underscores the escalating use of explosives – and the terror that they generate – by criminal groups in Mexico’s most violent state.

The bombing occurred on September 19 during a birthday celebration at a family restaurant in Guanajuato's Salamanca. Delivered by two men on a motorcycle, the package – wrapped like a present – exploded when it was opened, killing two people, according to a news release from the Guanajuato State Attorney General’s Office.

Those who died in the explosion were identified as the manager and a business partner of the restaurant. Five other people were injured.

Relatives of a partner in the restaurant later told the news organization Milenio that they had reported being extorted for weekly payments of 50,000 pesos (about $2,500) by individuals claiming to be from the Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación – CJNG). The Guanajuato’s Attorney General’s Office, however, said in a news release that prosecutors had never received any such complaint.

Mexican President Andrés López Obrador told reporters that the federal Attorney General's Office will likely be tasked with investigating the explosive attack.

“In the state of Guanajuato, more than in other parts, they have begun to use explosives to commit crimes and try to create terror, fear,” he said.

In 2020, a record 3,438 killings were registered in Guanajuato. As of June, nearly 1,500 people had been murdered there in 2021.

InSight Crime Analysis

While the motive behind the attack on the restaurant is unclear, the use of what appears to be a package bomb highlights how Mexico’s criminal groups are increasingly resorting to explosives – particularly in regions home to bloody turf wars.

For the past few years, Guanajuato has been the site of a conflict between the powerful CJNG and what’s left of a much smaller rival, the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have emerged among their weapons of war and have been found in stashes.  

For example, members of the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel were arrested for supposedly building improvised explosives in April of this year. The group is also known for using car bombs.   

Authorities in Guanajuato, meanwhile, seized 89 explosive devices during an operation in July.  Thirteen such devices others were seized in a September 2020 operation.

According to Mexican Defense Secretary, Luis Cresencio Sandoval González, improvised explosives attached to drones have been reported in Guanajuato and in Jalisco -- both states with significant CJNG presence.

In May of this year, an explosive drone strike in western Michoacán state was carried out by an alleged member of CJNG.

In an interview with InSight Crime, John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, founders of Small Wars Journal-El Centro, drew attention to the militarization of cartel violence, including the use of IEDs. According to Bunker, explosives are typically used as “threat messaging” to intimidate opponents.

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South Korea Becomes Transit Point for Mexican Methamphetamine

 

South Korea Becomes Transit Point for Mexican Methamphetamine

A ton of Mexican methamphetamine found in South Korea and suspected of being bound for Australia has shown how Mexican synthetic drugs continue to make inroads in the Asia-Pacific.

On September 1, prosecutors in the southern port city of Busan detained and charged a Korean male in his 30s for importing 404 kilograms of methamphetamine from Mexico hidden in 20 helical gear drives, according to reporting by the Korea JoongAng Daily.

The outlet cites prosecutors as saying it is the country’s largest-ever methamphetamine seizure, though the man is believed to have – in conjunction with an Australian accomplice – trafficked another 500 kilograms in July 2020 that were not intercepted but instead successfully smuggled into Australia.

“The two men smuggled drugs into Korea because they thought that smuggling meth from Korea to Australia would be less likely to be caught than smuggling methamphetamine directly from Mexico to Australia,” said a prosecutor from the Busan District Prosecutor’s Office.

It seems Australian authorities have since then detected both the route and smuggling method. In May, an investigation into a company importing helical gear drives led customs at the port of Sydney to seize 230 kilograms of methamphetamine in two shipments from South Korea.

Other Korean outlets have reported at least some of the drugs were destined for the domestic market. The Donga Ilbo newspaper claimed the original 404-kilogram methamphetamine cargo was meant to stay in the country, the remains of a larger amount that had been exported to Australia.

InSight Crime Analysis

Mexican methamphetamine is globalizing, with increasingly large quantities appearing not just in Europe but also Australia and East Asia. Yet as law enforcement agencies get better at identifying suspicious shipments and routes, traffickers look for alternatives – like South Korea.

With a strong reputation as a “drug-free” country, South Korea is a useful transit point for smugglers because it means they can avoid the stricter drug searches applied to cargo arriving directly from Mexico or – in the case of cocaine –  Colombia, a South Korean official told the South China Morning Post in 2018.

Alongside its superb infrastructure, including the port of Busan, one of the world’s busiest container ports, that makes the country an increasingly attractive thoroughfare for both methamphetamine and cocaine from Latin America, states a recent report by South Korea’s National Intelligence Service seen by UPI.

From there, the drugs mostly go to China, Hong Kong or Australia, all three of which have well-established methamphetamine markets. However, while Mexico is a key embarkation point for methamphetamine seized in Australia, South Korea is not, according to Australia’s latest Illicit Drug Data Report.

It therefore represents a new transit route for traffickers, one that appears to be of growing importance. Besides the South Korean seizures, in November 2020 Hong Kong interdicted a record half-ton of methamphetamine in a container bound for Australia. Originating in Mexico, the container had transited in South Korea, as well as Vietnam.

In line with the news report of the seized Mexican methamphetamine staying in South Korea, it also appears consumption of the drug, particularly of crystal meth, has increased in the country in recent years, asserts the UNODC’s 2021 “Synthetic Drugs in East and Southeast Asia” report.

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Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria

Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria was the pioneer in industrial-scale cocaine trafficking. Known as “El Patrón,” Escobar led the Medellín Cartel from the 1970s to the early 1990s. He oversaw each step of cocaine production, from sourcing coca base paste in Andean nations to feeding a booming US market for the drug. He also successfully challenged the State on extradition, showing that extreme violence could force governments to negotiate.

History

Like most of his partners in the Medellín Cartel, Escobar came from a humble social background. He dropped out of school because his family could not pay for his education and soon got involved in petty crime. His early criminal activities included smuggling stereo equipment and stealing tombstones to resell them.

Escobar then entered the cocaine trade, founding the Medellín Cartel in the 1970s and the Ochoa Vásquez brothers (Jorge Luis, Juan David and Fabio). The Ochoa brothers were initially the business brains of the outfit. Meanwhile, Escobar first oversaw the group's "protection" before emerging as its undisputed leader.

During the Medellín Cartel’s zenith in the 1980s and early 1990s, Escobar controlled nearly the entire cocaine supply chain. He oversaw the import of large, multi-ton shipments of coca base from Andean nations Peru and Bolivia into Colombia, where it was processed into cocaine in jungle labs. The criminal enterprise then stored the drug in Colombia before flying it to the United States. In the 1980s, the organization is estimated to have supplied over 80 percent of all cocaine shipped to the country, sending across some 15 tons per day.

In this period, kidnappings made by guerrilla groups led the State to collaborate with criminal groups. The 1981 kidnapping of the sister of the Ochoas led to the creation of a Medellín Cartel-funded paramilitary group known as Death to Kidnappers (Muerte a Secuestradores - MAS).

In the mid-1980s, Escobar’s hold on Medellín increased when he founded a criminal debt collection service known as the “Oficina de Envigado.” This was an office in the town hall of Envigado, a small municipality next to Medellín where Escobar grew up. Escobar used the municipal office to collect debts owed to him by drug traffickers and set the “sicarios” or hired killers on those who refused.

Unlike many drug traffickers today, Escobar was not afraid to flaunt his riches. His cartel is estimated to have earned around $420 million in revenue per week during the mid-1980s, and Escobar himself made Forbes' Billionaires list for seven years straight, between 1987 to 1993. His luxurious multimillion-dollar "Hacienda Nápoles" estate had its own zoo, and he reportedly ate from solid gold dinner sets.

Despite his opulent lifestyle, Escobar presented himself as a populist figure, persecuted by the upper classes for his own social background and efforts to help the poor. He attempted to stir up anti-establishment sentiment and win over disadvantaged communities by opening a public zoo, constructing 70 community soccer fields and building housing for the poor.

He could not break into Medellín's upper social classes, which blocked his application to join the city's top social club. His attempts to join the political elite were also crushed in the early 1980s when he was expelled from Colombia's Liberal Party and thrown out of his position as a deputy congressman.

These tensions escalated in the mid-1980s when the Medellín Cartel declared war on the Colombian state. In April 1984, the nation's then Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla was shot dead by sicarios working for Escobar. The Colombian state responded by immediately signing into law Escobar's extradition to the United States. In response, Escobar's hitmen murdered dozens of judges, police and several journalists in the late 1980s. During the 1989 presidential elections, Escobar's assassins murdered the Liberal Party candidate Luis Carlos Galán Sarmiento. They then made a failed attempt to kill Galán's replacement, Liberal Party presidential candidate César Augusto Gaviria Trujillo.

Using these tactics, Escobar eventually pushed the State to ban the extradition of Colombian nationals in the 1991 Constitutional Assembly. He managed to negotiate his surrender to authorities and took up residence in a jail known as the “Cathedral,” which he built. It was a jail only in name. Escobar controlled the guards and had a playhouse built on the grounds for when his daughter went to visit. He used his first year behind bars to reorganize the Medellín Cartel.

But his influence in the organization was dwindling. Resentment against Escobar grew when he raised a "tax" on cartel members, making them pay between $200,000 and $1 million in fees.

And in July 1992, Escobar's men found a stash of $20 million on a property belonging to cartel member Fernando Galeano. Escobar summoned Galeano and another associate, Gerardo Moncada, for a meeting at the Cathedral. Both were then killed by two of Escobar's sicarios.

On hearing of the killings, President César Gaviria ordered for Escobar to be sent from the Cathedral to a military base in Colombia’s capital, Bogotá. Before he could be transferred, Escobar escaped.

Ultimately, Escobar's former criminal associates teamed up with the government and gradually dismantled his empire. Out of money, luck, and with just one bodyguard left, authorities in Colombia gunned down Escobar on the rooftop of a house in Medellín on December 2, 1993.

Rumors have circulated for years around his death. Former paramilitary leader and mafia boss Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano, alias "Don Berna," claimed his brother fired Escobar's shot.

Criminal Activity

Escobar was instrumental in setting up the Medellín Cartel, feeding booming demand in the United States during the 1980s.

Through the 1980s and early 1990s, Escobar oversaw each step of the cocaine supply chain as the Medellín Cartel's undisputed leader. The organization sourced coca leaf from primary production points in Peru and Bolivia, processed it in Colombian jungle labs, then shipped cocaine to the United States, where operatives sold it on the streets.

He focused on international markets for cocaine and never sold the drug domestically to Colombians for consumption. Instead, Escobar initially used a Caribbean air route to feed the US market.

Escobar also ordered contract killings to target police, judges, politicians and journalists. On the other hand, the Medellín Cartel maintained high-level allies in security and justice institutions that largely protected its members from prosecution.

He dipped into extortion, too. While he was at the "Cathedral," he made his money by shaking down other drug traffickers, who had to pay him a fixed sum every month.

Finally, Escobar was known for investing profits from the drug trade in luxury goods, property, and works of art. He is also reported to have stashed his cash in “hidden coves,” allegedly burying it on his farms and under floors in many of his houses.

Geography

Escobar headed the Medellín Cartel, named after the Colombian city where it was based. However, his influence extended to as far as the United States, where he ran distribution networks.

Medellín has paid a high cost in blood for its role in the international cocaine trade. The city's murder rate was the highest in the world during Escobar's day.

To ensure the smooth transfer of cocaine from coca leaf to consumer, Escobar’s ties extended to Andean production nations (including Bolivia, Peru) and the United States and Canada.

He also sought refuge in Panama – a nation the Medellín Cartel appears to have passed drugs en route to the United States - when Colombian authorities attempted to capture him.

Allies and Enemies

Escobar’s success in the underworld relied on alliances far and wide. His actions, wealth and public profile also meant he had many enemies, whose eventual alliance would ultimately lead to his downfall.

The Ochoa Vásquez brothers (Jorge Luis, Juan David and Fabio) were close allies of Escobar for years. They helped form the Medellín Cartel and worked for hand in hand with the drug lord to run the organization. Others, such as José Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha, alias "El Mexicano," also worked with Escobar to provide the organization with muscle and logistical support.

Escobar also maintained alliances with associates based in Andean production nations. Jorge Roca Suárez, alias “Techo de Paja,” was identified as having provided cocaine shipments to Escobar and his uncle Roberto Suárez Gómez, known as the “King of Cocaine” in Bolivia.

The Medellín Cartel also formed alliances with Mexican groups to traffic cocaine into the United States. Escobar allied with leader of the Juárez Cartel, Amado Carrillo Fuentes, alias "El Señor de los Cielos," or "Lord of the Skies." Carrillo Fuentes used his fleet of aircraft to transport drugs belonging to Escobar as part of the Guadalajara Cartel.

One of Escobar's most consistent enemies was the Cali Cartel. The Cali Cartelinitially cooperated with the Medellín Cartel during the early 1980s to stabilize the drug market and divide territory in the United States. However, by 1988 the cartels were fighting a vicious turf war in Colombia.

The Cali Cartel ultimately funded elements of the Medellín Cartel that turned against Escobar after the 1992 murders of Galeano and Moncada in the Cathedral. They attacked Escobar's support structure by calling themselves the People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar (Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar - PEPES. One Cali Cartel leader, Francisco Hélmer Herrera Buitrago, alias "Pacho," claimed that he personally invested $30 million in the war against Escobar. The PEPES' principal objective was to hunt down Escobar. The PEPES worked with and were protected by the State.

PEPES membership included the founders of what became the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia - AUC): the brothers Fidel Antonio Castaño Gil, alias "Rambo," Carlos Castaño Gil, and José Vicente Castaño Gil, alias "El Profe," as well as "Don Berna," who joined the AUC later.

Former allies of Escobar, the Castaños grew distant from him for many reasons. These included his stated affinity for left-wing guerrillas, his alleged links to the M-19 rebel movement and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional - ELN).

Meanwhile, Don Berna turned on Escobar after El Patrón killed his boss, Fernando Galeano. Don Berna and his PEPES associates tracked down Escobar's family and connections, killing many of them. The police used Don Berna for information, leading to the capture of several Escobar associates, seizure of properties, and freezing his bank accounts. Don Berna claimed he and other members of PEPES were with the police that located Escobar on the day of his death.

To bring down Escobar, the PEPES worked alongside the Search Bloc, an elite police unit formed in 1989 made up of around 600 members and based out of the Carlos Holguín Police School in Medellín. When Escobar surrendered in 1991, its members were dispersed. It reformed following his escape from prison in 1992 and hunted him until his death in 1993.

Legacy and Influence

Escobar's death signaled the end of one era of drug trafficking and the birth of another. Mystique surrounding the drug lord has grown since 1993, and endless myths have circulated.

The Medellín Cartel no longer exists, nor does the cartel structure Escobar help to found, which involved controlling all the links in the drug chain from production to retail.

While the Colombian department of Antioquia, of which Medellín is the capital, remains pivotal to the nation’s cocaine trade, today's drug lords bear little resemblance to Escobar.

Following Escobar’s downfall, the structure of Colombia’s underworld -- and Medellín's especially – shifted. It gradually went from being hierarchical and dominated by a few key actors to more federal, fragmented and horizontal. The "Oficina" - which had its roots in Envigado - transformed into a mafia federation that now regulates almost all criminal activity in Medellín.

A modern-day counterpart to Escobar himself is hard to come by. There is no single figure able to exercise control even in Medellín today, let alone over a large portion of the international cocaine trade. Instead, a given figure climbs up the ladder, is often quickly identified by authorities and captured. Today, Escobar’s closest counterparts would be the Mexican capos.

Since Escobar, a new generation of “Invisible” traffickers has emerged. They have learned that demonstrating a luxury lifestyle and using extreme public violence is counterproductive. Instead, anonymity is their protection plan. This new generation of drug traffickers looks like young entrepreneurs or highly qualified businessmen. They are unrecognizable from those who dominated in Escobar’s day.

With this, the "man of the people" model traffickers like Escobar traditionally tried to transmit is dying out. Mexican trafficker Joaquín Guzmán Loera, alias "El Chapo" operated using this approach and Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, alias "El Mencho" has replicated it to a certain extent. But now, criminal governance and loyalty are largely being cultivated at the group level, not by individual leaders.

Escobar achieved a level of state penetration which helped members of his cartel to avoid capture for years. The fact he was elected to Congress as an alternate tells us about how deeply he could achieve this.

Drug traffickers still have links to state institutions. Political elites have been historically linked to drug trafficking and corruption. Other institutions continue to be penetrated at a more local level. The Urabeños, one of Colombia's most influential criminal groups, for example, have worked through corruption networks linked to local governments in Colombia.

The US Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act may also be considered as another legacy of Escobar's influence. Made law in 1999, it permits "the identification of and worldwide sanctions against foreign narcotics traffickers whose activities threaten US security, foreign policy, or the economy." Its purpose is to prevent foreign drug traffickers from trading with US companies or individuals.

Finally, Escobar remains a contemporary narcoculture symbol, the “kingpin” in the popular imagination. His name is often used to refer to drug lords that have cornered the drug market in certain Latin American countries. However, few – if any – have ever built a cocaine empire to rival Escobar, who continues to inspire numerous books and television shows, with his face even stamped on to drug packets.

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As Marijuana Profits Dry Up, Mexico Crime Groups Turn to Alcohol and Logging

Mexico remains the main international provider of marijuana for the United States, but this has greatly diminished since 2013, forcing certain criminal groups to adapt and look for other funds.

As more US states move towards legalization, “Mexican marijuana has largely been supplanted by domestic-produced marijuana,” according to the US Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) 2020 National Drug Threat Assessment. 

The report shows marijuana seizures along the southwest US-Mexico border declined by more than 81 percent between 2013 and 2020, suggesting Mexican crime groups have significantly scaled down their marijuana trafficking operations.

A high-ranking Sinaloa Cartel operative in Sonora state told InSight Crime that the marijuana business is “barely profitable now.” 

“I only traffic marijuana to pay some of my people in the organization. I’m paying them with kilograms [of marijuana] that they manage to smuggle and get paid for, but it’s really coming to a point where it’s no longer a viable business,” he said. 

The border state of Chihuahua is Mexico's second-largest marijuana producer behind Sinaloa, accounting for 20 percent of production nationwide, according to a 2016 report by a Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (UAM) researcher analyzing drug cultivation. And much of this comes from the Sierra Tarahumara, a vast network of canyons and mountains.

Two of Mexico's main criminal organizations operate in the Sierra Tarahumara: the Sinaloa Cartel and Juárez Cartel through its armed wing, known as La Línea.

Over the past 10 years, fighting between these two groups has had a constant ebb and flow.

But both of these criminal heavyweights are having to adjust to many US states decriminalizing or legalizing marijuana. To do so, they have monopolized other commercial activities like alcohol sales and logging, while also extorting the region’s local farmworkers to keep profits alive.

Alcohol Monopoly in Chihuahua 

Starting from La Junta highway at the entrance to the Sierra Tarahumara, only “authorized” stores can sell alcohol. Criminal organizations have threatened national chains like Oxxo to stop selling alcohol or risk facing retaliation, according to residents, business owners and state officials speaking anonymously for fear of reprisal.

For the most part, according to the cartel operative interviewed by InSight Crime, the alcohol monopoly is in the hands of the Sinaloa Cartel, specifically Noriel Portillo, alias “El Chueco.” 

“Only authorized stores can sell alcohol. That way, there is no competition, and all of those earnings go to the organization,” he said. 

This started as a direct consequence of the depreciation of marijuana prices, according to the operative. The municipalities under this rule stretch all the way from Bocoyna, Guachochi, Batopilas, Urique, and out to Guadalupe y Calvo.

He added that all alcohol distribution trucks are “stopped at the highways connecting to the Sierra and asked to go back. We maintain our own distribution, and businesses have to buy only from us.” 

SEE ALSO: HOW TO QUIT WEED WITHOUT WITHDRAWALS OR SLEEPLESS NIGHTS

The cartel is buying massive quantities of alcohol in major cities like Cuauhtémoc or the capital, Chihuahua, and then transporting those products by truck to several municipalities inside the Sierra Tarahumara. They are the ones granting authorization to sell and distribute all sorts of alcohol without any legal permits. 

The operative said they are not forcing everyone to sell alcohol, but those who want to must have permission from the cartel.

Alcohol regulatory authorities have virtually no presence in the Sierra Tarahumara, according to the cartel operative. 

Most products go for two or three Mexican pesos (roughly $0.10) above the average retail price, which InSight Crime corroborated in several stores. And some restaurants aren’t selling any alcohol out of fear of negotiating with crime groups. 

“We had to go with their deal, otherwise we would have to stop selling and close our business,” said a women from a local store in Guachochi.

Timber Trade Thrives as Marijuana Falls

San Juanito, a small wooded town at the beginning of the Sierra Tarahumara and the epicenter of fighting between the Sinaloa and Juárez cartels, used to be known as the “San Juanito forest” for its beautiful, thick tree cover. But after years of relentless logging - both legal and illegal - locals now joke and call it the “San Juanito Valley.”

Driving through it, the devastation is no secret: the areas surrounding the main highway are barren, with nothing but wood stumps for miles. 

For almost six years, both the Sinaloa and Juárez cartels have relied heavily on the logging industry. The Sierra Tarahumara has historically been a large source of lumber for all of Mexico. With around half of its 16.5 million hectares forested by pine and oak trees, according to Community Technical Consulting (La Consultoría Técnica Comunitaria - CONTEC), a non-profit organization defending human and land rights in the Sierra Tarahumara, this area provides around 10 million square meters of timber that is sold in bulk to construction companies or for use in building furniture.  

SEE ALSO: The Zetas’ Model of Organized Crime is Leaving Mexico in Ruins

With the heavy cartel presence, it’s become almost impossible to know how much of the wood taken into the sawmills is legitimate or tainted by organized crime, either illegally produced by such groups or by legal sawmills forced to pay a tax in order to operate. 

People around San Juanito and the neighboring town of Creel were very hesitant to speak out loud about illegal logging. A local artisan told InSight Crime that the illegal timber trade has “everybody’s fingerprints on it.” 

“Authorities, politicians, narcos and entire families are in the business,” he said. “But this is something we don’t discuss.” 

Extorting Local Farmworkers 

During the summer months, hundreds of men leave the cover of the Sierra Tarahumara to travel northbound to major cities like Cuauhtémoc or Chihuahua to work on apple, tomato, chili, pecan and bean farms. Big companies have established massive operations around these two cities and hire their workforce from all over the state. 

But more recently, men leaving the Sierra to work have been required to notify cartel operatives in charge of monitoring who leaves and where they go.

A local Indigenous farmer returning from an apple tree farm, who spoke with InSight Crime under the condition of anonymity for fear of retaliation, said that crime groups are now demanding a percentage of their earnings on their way back home. 

“Sometimes they are the ones who transport us to the farms and back, and they say the illegal toll is payment for the ride,” he said. 

It’s not clear why the amount charged varies, but local workers said it ranges from a five to 10 percent cut of their earnings for a whole season, which amounts to roughly $800 for two full months of work.

Most locals interviewed pointed to the Sinaloa Cartel as the organization behind this operation, but La Línea’s involvement couldn’t be dismissed.

State authorities said they were unaware of this new extortion trend.

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How Mexico's Cartels Have Learned Military Tactics

How Mexico's Cartels Have Learned Military Tactics

As violence has continued to rise in Mexico year after year, criminal groups have adopted an increasingly militarized approach to their tactics, weaponry and training.

InSight Crime sat down with Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, founders of Small Wars Journal and editors of a new book, Illicit Tactical Progress: Mexican Cartel Tactical Notes 2013-2020, which dives deep into how this evolution has taken place.

InSight Crime (IC): Your latest book focuses on the tactical evolutions of Mexico’s principal criminal groups over time. How would you summarize that evolution? What are the most frequent “evolutions” seen across different criminal groups?

Robert J. Bunker (RJB): Cartel tactical evolution has been increasingly militarized over time with sporadic retrograde movements taking place, such as when the more centralized Zetas fragmented and their tactical sophistication was greatly diminished. Military standoff munitions—rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and 40mm type-launched rifle grenades—have been well integrated into the cartel arsenals. Enforcers or foot soldiers are increasingly wearing body armor, combat harnesses, and carrying assault rifles. 50-caliber rifles are fairly common and are typically utilized as the main armament of improvised armored fighting vehicles (IAFVs). 

Cartel videos, taken on camera phones and posted online, are appearing, which portray primitive narcotanque (narco-tank) battles taking place in some of the contested regions and plazas within Mexico. The cartels have also used improvised explosive devices (IEDs)—typically as threat messaging—along with the cyclical use of anti-personnel type car bombs, rather than those carrying larger payloads for infrastructure targeting purposes in Colombia in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

IC: What are the principal motors of these tactical evolutions? New weaponry, new methods of smuggling drugs, new pressures from the Army, National Guard or other criminal rivals?

John P. Sullivan (JPS): Mexican cartel tactical adaptation and innovation result from multiple drivers. First, it can be technological (e.g., new weapons) or non-technological—as seen in organizational factors such as forging new alliances, new organizational practices, non-traditional tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), new marketing practices and even organizational splintering and fragmentation. Tactical evolution allows criminal armed groups to gain an edge over competitors, accrue power and territorial control, and enhance profits and survivability. All of the factors mentioned are tactical drivers, but the interaction with criminal rivals or allies is key to promulgating new tactics and practices.

IC: Has the Mexican government and military been able to adapt their tactics in response?

JPS: The short answer is yes. The longer answer is that it varies over time and place. It also differs by levels of government, and again that is variable. Municipal and state police may adapt quicker due to the proximity of a threat and may have less organizational capacity. In contrast, federal forces, such as the National Guard, the Army and the Navy, have a greater organizational capacity to adapt to evolving TTPs. Indeed, at a strategic level, it could be argued that the deployment of the National Guard, a gendarmerie-type force, is itself an adaptation to tactical circumstances. Overall, tactical adaptation on both sides is key to tactical success. Negative adaptation, such as corruption and co-option of state forces to ensure personal safety, is also evident. Municipal and state forces have traditionally been more susceptible to these factors, which has tactical and operational and strategic ramifications.

IC: You report on how Mexican groups have increasingly had access to military-grade weaponry. What are the main ways they obtain such arsenals?

RJB: Sources for illicit weapons going to the cartels vary, but three primary sources for military-grade weaponry exist. The first source is 50 cal. Barrett semi-automatic ‘sporting’ rifles and semi-automatic rifles, such as AR-15s and AK-47s, were purchased by straw buyers in the US and then smuggled into Mexico. The ‘civilian’ model rifles can then be switched over to burst and full-auto capability. The second source is from looted Central American military armories, which have pretty much been cleaned out, and international arms shipments coming in from across the world, with China in the past being one of the major source countries. This hardware, such as the RPGs and other anti-tank weapons, launched and thrown grenades, and medium and heavy machine guns, represents true military-grade infantry arms. The third source comes from within Mexico itself and is obtained from corrupted political and military officials. This concerns military weaponry smuggled off Army and National Guard bases and arsenals in conflict zones and seized cartel weaponry that somehow finds its way back into the hands of the cartels rather than being destroyed.

IC: Mexico has seen areas where fighting between criminal groups, or such groups and authorities, has become bogged down, with front lines and even defensive trenches being drawn across different municipalities. I am thinking of areas such as Aguililla in Michoacán or around Irapuato in Guanajuato. Would you agree with that characterization?

JPS: I agree in part, but the situation is fluid and varies depending upon the phase of operations, terrain and actors involved. In addition, these are often tactical rather than operational choices. These TTPs are used to interrupt lines of communication (access and mobility by police, National Guard, and military and naval forces), canalize response (facilitating ambushes) or facilitate escape. The trenches are usually transient and are similar to narcobloqueos (barricades formed from debris and burning vehicles typically used in urban settings).

IC: There have been sporadic reports of the use of IAFVs, or “narco-tanks,” since 2015, including mention of a narco-tank factory run by the Gulf Cartel. But is there evidence these have ever been useful to achieve criminal goals, or are they simply a way for groups with the resources to build them to show off?

JPS: That depends upon what you mean by ‘criminal goals.’ The short answer is they use them because they have utility. That utility is both symbolic (projecting prowess) and instrumental (providing a means of protection and mobility to fighters). They are primarily used in cartel vs. cartel operations in areas where the cartels are battling for territorial control. They have been used in Monterrey by the Gulf Cartel and the Zetas. They have also been used by the Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación - CJNG), with a workshop for assembling these IAFVs discovered in Tuxpan in late 2019. And, of course, they have been used in Michoacán. The Sinaloa Cartel used lighter improvised armored fighting vehicles (IAFVs) in Culiacán to engage government forces in 2019 during the thwarted capture of Ovidio Guzmán López.

SEE ALSO: Who Killed Pablo Escobar?

IC: Michoacan seems to see the most frequent use of IAFVs by autodefensas and the CJNG alike. What has their use achieved there?

JPS: In Michoacán, IAFVs have been used by the CJNG and Cárteles Unidos to project their presence and in armed inter-group commando battles. They have also contributed to the employment of anti-IAFV trenches by the Viagras, Cárteles Unidos and/or local community autodefensas (self-defense groups) to thwart CJNG IAFVs, monstruos (monster trucks), narco-tanks and soft-skinned vehicles and gun trucks with mounted infantry elements. Their use has been limited to the duration of CJNG offensives. The use of both IAFVs and anti-IAFV trenches is usually short-term, offering tactical advantage during sustained operations but little sustained operational or strategic benefit.

IC: The splintering of the Gulf Cartel leads to some interesting observations in terms of military strategy, with markings on vehicles and the potential use of more advanced strategies such as overwatch positions and kill zones. Your book references the start of the splintering in 2015 but have you seen any tactical evolutions there in the latest round of violence in 2021?

JPS: First, it is important to recognize that group fragmentation and splintering are both strong drivers of violence and tactical innovation. Second, the classic case of fragmentation driving such innovation is found in the Gulf Cartel-Zetas split in 2010. The 2015 splintering of the Gulf Cartel and battles for primacy among the Rojos, Metros and Cyclones, among others, involved the use of IAFVs, high-intensity firefights, and beheadings. Later indications include the possession of anti-personnel mines by the Gulf Cartel in Tamaulipas in 2018. More recently, we documented the use of underground bunkers by the Gulf Cartel, most likely by the Scorpions, in 2020 near Reynosa, Tamaulipas.

IC: The CJNG seems to be engaging in more and more “PR stunts,” from the show of force video in Jalisco to the unveiling of members without masks in Michoacán. But has the CJNG’s national spread and dominance been accompanied by an evolution in their force projection and use of superior numbers?

RJB: I’ll focus on the first part of the question as I address the latter one in a follow-on response. The cartels, including CJNG, utilize narratives (such as the social-bandit and Robin Hood themes) and propaganda all the time. Sometimes it’s clumsy and cringy—such as when a terrified townsperson is being given aid during the COVID-19 pandemic by heavily armed cartel fighters and tries to give a weak smile in appreciation. At other times, it appears much more sophisticated. As the CJNG gains in dominance, it is coming into increasing conflict with the government, which is forcing the cartel to engage in these types of strategic communication. The PR stunt of the cartel members not wearing face coverings readily signifies that CJNG is not afraid of governmental prosecution or targeting of its personnel. This portrays the implied impunity the cartel now enjoys.

The videos of the heavily armed CJNG commando units—with all their armored vehicles and firepower—impresses on the Mexican public, other competing cartels, and governmental agents the sophisticated military-like capability that it can now field. I see the PR stunts as a softer form of communication as opposed to the torture videos and narcoterrorism incident scenes (body dumps and narcomantas with messages written on them), which are meant to terrify the opponents of the CJNG.

IC: How challenging is it for groups with a large membership but horizontal hierarchy, such as Sinaloa Cartel or CJNG, to control tactical decision-making and training nationwide?

JPS: It is always a challenge for all organizations—government or criminal enterprises—to maintain organizational integrity. The networked nature of the Sinaloa Cartel of CJNG both aids and complicates that strategic decision-making authority. First, networked criminal groups are not unitary entities. They are often comprised of individual gangs and cells that have a loose affiliation with the larger ‘cartel’ enterprise. The control is often mutual benefit, personal influence, and violent enforcement when subordinate members or affiliates act contrary to cartel dictates. But, there is often a large measure of latitude as long as the strategic vision and financial tribute (cuota) is paid. Control is often devolved to subordinate elements.

This tactical flexibility is a double-edged sword. It can, and does, allow flexibility and tactical innovation but can also lead to competition for control and fragmentation. Information operations, instrumental violence, enforcing ‘group identity’ through narcocultura (narco-culture), and of course, income generation and profit-sharing opportunities reinforce discipline.

IC: Do all new recruits of CJNG, for example, get the same smattering of tactics, no matter where they come from?

RJB: CJNG is based more on a franchise model than the Zetas, who were more centralized and who they are commonly compared with. For this reason, their tactical sophistication varies widely between the different sub-franchises with no national or regional CJNG training academy system evident. That would be giving them too much credit. On the other hand, I’ve been viewing their kill-team and commando propaganda videos for some years now. The equipment of their personnel has greatly increased in sophistication, firepower and personal protection. The number of their improvised armored fighting vehicles and their unit sizes have also grown, akin to that of a mounted infantry company.

This makes me think that, in addition to the franchises, CJNG leader Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, alias "El Mencho," has developed one or more centralized cartel mobile forces that provide operational support to the franchises from time to time. These units would be far better trained than the franchise foot soldiers and would allow for superior CJNG concentration of forces against the localized defending gangs/cartels and autodefensas. Still, this capacity is not as evolved as under the Gulf Cartel (and later only the Zetas), who had very advanced command and control and intelligence units and thus could shift mobile strategic reserves throughout their territories. Still, it is cause for some concern about the growing power of CJNG. 

IC: While El Mencho usually remains quite low-profile in his Jalisco backwaters, his name has been increasingly used on videos and narcomantas in Michoacán. Considering he comes from Aguililla and seems to feel the Cártel de Tepalcatepec’s existence as a personal affront, do you think he views Michoacán as a personal vendetta?

JPS: Michoacán is his birthplace and, while it is hard to get into his head, there is often a personal and emotive attachment to your home. There are many influences on a leader’s decision-making and strategic choice. El Mencho is an aggressive and experienced transnational actor. He worked for the Milenio Cartel and transitioned that experience into making the CJNG one of the major criminal enterprises with transnational reach. He uses both instrumental and symbolic violence, as well as information operation, to reinforce his control. He has emphasized consolidating control far beyond Jalisco and Michoacán, notably to Guanajuato, but also Colima and Nayarit. His reactions against the Cárteles Unidos may have personal dimensions stemming back to the Milenio Cartel days. But in my view, this is largely strategic and intended to consolidate control, protect markets, especially the increasingly important synthetic drug market), and degrade rivals.

IC: Criminal fragmentation of Mexico’s main gangs has led to a newer wave of criminal groups. Would you agree that these smaller, localized groups tend to be more violent while chasing a smaller share of criminal economies? How/do their tactics differ from the larger groups they once belonged to?

JPS: Fragmentation and splinter groups are key drivers or beneficiaries of tactical innovation. The process of splintering is essentially a battle for power. This state of competition is often violent—with extreme violence used to demonstrate prowess and eliminate rivals. The tactical expression of that violence is often brutal, graphic, and characterized as ‘barbarization.’ The new ‘splinter’ groups often take the skills, TTPs, and tactical preferences learned in their former organization with them. This leads to a transmission of time-tested TTPs and proliferation of tradecraft to the newer groups. Our colleague Nathan Jones has described a ‘bacterial conjugation’ model where “violent tactics, techniques, and procedures such as dissolving bodies in acid, asphyxiation, and infantry tactics, through individual traffickers” are transmitted and amplified into new, at times more powerful groups. 

Occasionally, these new groups embrace novel or non-traditional tactics to enhance their share of illicit markets. At others, they seek new opportunities, such as microtrafficking in local Mexican markets or embracing new products such as fentanyl, or new weapons, such as weaponized consumer drones.

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