Phone Extortion in Mexico Continuing to Rise Despite Low Success Rate

 A new report claims the success rate of phone extortion is dropping in Mexico, but the fluid nature of this crime makes it difficult to prove.

Between 2013 and 2019, the number of businesses in Mexico receiving such extortion calls increased by nearly 22 percent, but total payouts diminished by over 15 percent, according to a recently published investigation by Mexico Evalúa, one of Mexico's leading public policy think tanks.

SEE ALSO: US Sanctions Reveal CJNG’s Grip on Mexico Port To Move Fentanyl

With a focus on the northern state of Baja California, the report looks at why the frequency of phone extortions has continued to rise at the same time that their success rate has seen a consistent drop.

Amid this context, Baja California ranked as the state with the fourth-highest level of extortion in the country, but with a success rate of just 6 percent.

Extortion attempts by phone often see business owners threatened by criminals, who demand payments of between 500 to 10,000 pesos ($24 to $480), the head of a Tijuana-based business association told El Universal. These schemes often involve revealing sensitive information and intimate details of recent activities to create the illusion that the victims were being followed.

InSight Crime Analysis

One of the longstanding criminal economies in Latin America, phone extortion may be seeing a drop in its effectiveness – a change that could be due to several factors.  

Mexico Evalúa notes the difficulty of accurately measuring the success rates of phone extortion, given the relatively anonymous nature of the crime. Authorities readily acknowledge that the number of victims may be far higher, since reporting this crime remains infrequent. Additionally, the percentage of victims paying up has long been pretty low, as those behind the extortion attempts, often prisoners calling from inside jail, make millions of such phone calls a year. One 2018 study showed that 3.7 million extortion calls had been made from just seven prisons.

The government has taken steps to reduce this type of extortion by simply blocking cell phone signals around Mexican prisons.

The public's awareness of how phone extortion schemes work may also explain the drop in the success rate. Traditionally, calls to victims involved threats of physical harm or kidnapping, but the Mexican government, and others around the region, have carried out prolonged media campaigns to raise awareness regarding extortion threats and how to report them.

Extorters, however, are changing tactics. According to authorities in Baja California, the threat of physical harm to business owners is being replaced by the threat of spreading fake news online about their company – most often by publishing false information about the businesses on a website called Noticias de México until victims give in and pay.

SEE ALSO: Coronavirus Affects Extortion Payments in Mexico and Central America

Authorities have also had some success going after the bank accounts used for these crimes. Mexico’s state Financial Intelligence Unit (Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera - UIF), which traditionally seizes bank accounts used for money laundering and drug trafficking, has made it a priority to track bank accounts used to receive money from extortion victims.

The strategy, though, may have spurred a new extortion scheme, which sees the criminals posing as UIF officials to try and obtain sensitive financial information used to extort victims.

While the success rate of extortion calls may be declining, Mexico's citizens will continue to be plagued by criminal gangs seeking ransom or extortion payments via unregistered cellphone numbers. The number of such calls has climbed rapidly, with nationwide earnings from this crime now estimated at over $500 million a year.

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Rafael Caro Quintero disagrees with Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo over business

 

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Cartel Gunmen Take Out Surveillance Cameras in Sinaloa, Mexico

 

Cartel Gunmen Take Out Surveillance Cameras in Sinaloa, Mexico

In Mexico, gunmen have gone on a shooting spree of police surveillance cameras in the city of Culiacán – attacks that not only blind authorities but reinforce cartel control.

The shootings have become such a concern that agents with the Sinaloa Attorney General’s Office gathered shotgun casings after the latest incident on October 9, news outlet El Debate reported. That shooting, on a bridge outside the city center, followed a September 28 attack in which armed men shot 84 cameras across the city.

Residents reported hearing gunshots at about 5 a.m. that day. Videos were soon posted on social media of shots being fired, which some mistook for a gunfight. Authorities said the gunmen moved around the city in at least eight vans. They also dropped spike strips in the roads to puncture the tires of police vehicles, according to a report by Revista Espejo.

According to city and state security officials, municipal police possibly aided in the security camera shooting spree. Culiacán Security Secretary Mauricio García Ramírez said at least four elements of the police’s prevention unit are under investigation for possible links to criminal groups, Revista Espejo reported.

Following the September attack, some 150 people employed in businesses around the city center did not show up to work out of fear, El Debate reported.

In early October, only 45 of the city’s 300  surveillance cameras were operating. Since being introduced in 2017, more than 1,000 cameras have been destroyed by criminal groups, according to Revista Espejo.

InSight Crime Analysis

Though there’s continued debate about the effectiveness of camera surveillance in deterring crime, there’s no doubt that taking these cameras out of service helps to intimidate businesses, hamper law enforcement, and assert criminal control over Culiacán’s residents.

The cameras serve as “the eyes of the police,” Security Subsecretary Carlos Alberto Hernández Leyva said in 2019 when a series of shootings left just 400 cameras in operation.

Their destruction hinders patrols and drains the state’s security budget.

Since 2013, the government of Sinaloa has purchased more than 2,600 cameras, investing some 236 million pesos (about $11.5 million) in the police surveillance system, according to Revista Espejo.

SEE ALSO: US Sanctions Reveal CJNG’s Grip on Mexico Port To Move Fentanyl

Despite the number of cameras destroyed, only one person has been arrested in connection with the attacks on the city's surveillance system.

The destruction of Culiacán’s security cameras certainly appears to be systematic. For this reason, it’s most likely the work of the Sinaloa Cartel, or gangs contracted by the criminal group.

Residents of Culiacán are no strangers to these type of power moves by the cartel. In October 2019, the city fell under siege as gunmen forced the release of Ovidio Guzmán López, son of kingpin Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera.

The ongoing destruction of surveillance cameras in the city serves as a reminder of the group’s omnipresence.

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US Sanctions Reveal CJNG’s Grip on Mexico Port To Move Fentanyl

 

US Sanctions Reveal CJNG’s Grip on Mexico Port To Move Fentanyl

The United States has sanctioned four suspected members of Mexico’s powerful CJNG cartel, alleging that they controlled drug operations at a Pacific port that is a crucial entry point for fentanyl and methamphetamine precursor chemicals from Asia.

Aldrin Miguel Jarquín Jarquín, Jose Jesus Jarquín Jarquín, César Enrique Diaz de León Sauceda and Fernando Zagal Antón are alleged to be members of the Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generació – CJNG) operating out of the Manzanillo port and surrounding areas in the state of Colima, the US Treasury Department said in an October 6 news release.

Treasury officials say the men “coordinate CJNG’s drug trafficking operations through the port of Manzanillo” and maintain contact with cocaine suppliers in Colombia.

The Jarquín Jarquín brothers, as well as Diaz de Leon Sauceda, are allegedly among the most senior members of the CJNG operating out of Manzanillo. They report directly Julio Alberto Castillo Rodriguez, the son-in-law of CJNG boss Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, alias “El Mencho,” according to the Treasury Department.

The CJNG’s “criminal success is partly due to its influence over strategic locations such as Manzanillo,” said Andrea M. Gacki, director of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

“This Pacific coast port serves as a significant gateway for Colombian cocaine and precursor chemicals imported from Asia, including those used to synthesize fentanyl,” she said in the news release.

It’s not just fentanyl products moving through Manzanillo. In early July, 50,000 kilograms of benzyl chloride, used in the production of methamphetamines, were seized at the port.

InSight Crime Analysis

Control of the port of Manzanillo is crucial to CJNG’s efforts to dominate the lucrative synthetic drug trade into the United States and the group’s expansion across Mexico.

A report, "Mexico’s Role in the Deadly Rise of Fentanyl," published in February 2019 by InSight Crime and the Wilson Center found that the port of Manzanillo accounted for the lion’s share of seizures of fentanyl precursor chemicals entering the country.

The CJNG, though, wasn’t always the dominant player in what had once been a sleepy port. In 2016, violence surged around Colima in a three-way battle among the CJNG, the Sinaloa Cartel and a faction of the Zetas. The CJNG was ultimately able to consolidate its control of Manzanillo by forging alliances with local gangs.

The CJNG was also positioned to deal in fentanyl, given its background in methamphetamine trafficking.

The group’s control of the port has been crucial to its swift rise as one of Mexico’s main fentanyl traffickers into the United States, according to a January 2020 US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) intelligence report.

Combating smuggling at the Manzanillo port has become a priority of Mexico’s President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, who visited Manzanillo himself as a show of commitment.  In January of this year, he gave the Mexican Navy, direct control of the country’s seaports.

The US and China have also worked together to crack down on the supply of fentanyl and fentanyl-related compounds. But halting the smuggling of fentanyl and its precursors is not likely to happen any time soon.

The shutdown of the Chinese city of Wuhan – an epicenter of fentanyl manufacturing – amid the COVID-19 pandemic led to the sourcing of fentanyl and its precursors from other countries. Meanwhile, criminal groups like the CJNG ramped up their manufacturing capabilities.

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In the Riviera Maya, Cartel Extortion Schemes Know No Limits

 In the Riviera Maya, Cartel Extortion Schemes Know No Limits

Despite the pandemic’s economic fallout being felt throughout the Riviera Maya, cartels have continued their extortion schemes in Mexico's popular tourist destination, where their operations have grown to target everyone from local vendors to large businesses.

The breadth of cartel extortion schemes in the Riviera Maya was the focus of a report published in late September by Mexico Evalúa, one of Mexico's leading public policy think tanks. The report highlighted a sting in which Quintana Roo state policemen posed as employees and security guards of a business to uncover an extortion ring.

Officials investigated a group that collected derecho/cobro de piso (user rights), one of the 12 forms of extortion recognized by state authorities. The operation resulted in police stopping a van, designed to look like public transportation, carrying the group's members. All were arrested on charges of extortion.

From costumed characters to high-end hotels and restaurants, everyone is a target of this widespread extortion. According to James Tobin, a member of the National Public Security Council, the extortion prices range from around 200 pesos (about $10) a day for individual vendors to anywhere from 25,000 to 100,000 pesos ($1,200 to $4,900) for larger businesses.

According to Mexico Evalúa, the primary groups responsible for extortion in the area are the country's two most powerful criminal groups, the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación - CJNG), as well as local group the Pelones. However, common criminals have also been known to pose as cartel members to shake down local businesses.

Additional extortion-related arrests in Cancún and Playa del Carmen underscore this scheme's prevalence throughout the Rivera Maya.

In recent years, the Riviera Maya has seen a rise in the extortion of resorts, along with a variety of other methods of extortion, including one of the world’s largest ATM scams.

InSight Crime Analysis

While the pandemic has slowed the tourism-based economy throughout the Riviera Maya, cartel extortion schemes have not only continued to grow but spread to target nearly all local businesses.

In Quintana Roo, derecho/cobro de piso ranks among the most common extortion methods, according to the state’s Secretary of Public Security, Lucio Hernández.

The state of Quintana Roo had the second highest rate of extortion complaints per 100,000 residents in 2020, according to the Quintana Roo Security and Gender Observatory (Observatorio de Seguridad y Género de Quintana Roo - Osege). In the first semester of this year, cases have been reduced by 62 percent, but 911 calls related to this crime in the same period have increased by 49 percent.

Yet, almost 99 percent of extortion cases go unreported.

The reasons for the lack of reports by victims of extortion are two-fold: a fear of reprisal and a distrust of the authorities. In this context, testimonies collected by these Mexico Evalúa investigations provide significant insight into the victims of these extortion schemes.

They also illustrate how these extortion schemes are being carried out – from threats over the phone to in-person visits to businesses, often involving intimidation or violence toward employees.

However, the prevalence of extortion schemes is not just unique to Quintana Roo, as Mexico Evalúa has also investigated and analyzed extortion case studies in the states of Chihuahua, Michoacán, and Baja California.

Nationally, there were nearly one million cases of extortion recorded in 2020 – with 1,821 out of every 10,000 businesses victimized. It's estimated that extortion costs the Mexican economy an average of 226,000 million pesos ($11.3 million) annually, or approximately 1.25 percent of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

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Cyclones, Scorpions and Old School Killers - The War for Tamaulipas

Cyclones, Scorpions and Old School Killers - The War for Tamaulipas

It was so simple once. The Gulf Cartel and its ancestors maintained control of Tamaulipas for eight decades.

In the 1930s, Juan Nepomuceno Guerra smuggled whisky across the Rio Grande during Prohibition. The enterprise swiftly grew to all types of contraband. By the 1980s, this business had been formalized in the Gulf Cartel (Cartel del Golfo – CDG).

Federal prosecutors. Border agents. Police officers. All of them answered to the group’s leader, Juan García Abrego. Guerra’s nephew, Abrego, was the first Mexican drug trafficker to be included in the FBI’s Top Ten Most Wanted List in 1985.

This marked the birth of the US-Mexico border cartels.

It couldn’t last.

In the 1990s, the Zetas, a paramilitary-style group of former Mexican special forces, were hired to guard CDG leadership. The story of how the Zetas grew in influence and membership until outsizing the CDG – as well as the war that ensued and its ongoing impact on violence in Mexico today – has been well documented.

The Zetas’ betrayal began a pattern of units created as bodyguards or enforcers eventually trying to supplant their own leaders. As the Cárdenas Guillén family, which led the CDG and had recruited the Zetas, fractured and struggled to maintain control, different “units” were created across Tamaulipas, ostensibly to guard specific leaders or cities. In Reynosa, the Metros; in Camargo and Mier, the Rojos. In later years, the Ciclones (Cyclones) arose in Matamoros. The Escorpiones (Scorpions) were the private guard of Antonio Ezequiel Cárdenas Guillén, alias “Tony Tormenta.” After he was killed in 2010, the Scorpions went to ground in Matamoros and are now allied to the Cyclones.

Over time, the Zetas would also split, only worsening Mexico’s criminal fragmentation. But their successors have been fewer, with the Old School Zetas (Zetas Vieja Escuela) and Northeast Cartel (Cartel del Noreste) emerging as the main groups.

These names continue to haunt Tamaulipas to this day, engaging in a cycle of alliances and internecine warfare for control of what’s left of the united Gulf Cartel. Parts of Tamaulipas may seem calm for a while, only to fall into violence once again. Attempts to stop the violence are Sisyphean, with constant reporting of security forces arresting a leader of one faction or gunning down a commander of one another.

In recent months, Tamaulipas has been dealing with the aftermath of a June massacre that left 19 people dead in the city of Reynosa. The fallout has been confusing. The killings were allegedly carried out by the Cyclones and Scorpions to dislodge the Metros. One of those believed to be responsible was found murdered. The leader of the Metros was arrested by police, rescued in spectacular fashion by a commando of his own men and found dead weeks later. Then, the various warring CDG factions even signed a truce in July 2021.

Here, InSight Crime profiles the current status of the main players in the conflict with Tamaulipas:

Gulf Cartel Factions

Scorpions and Cyclones

The Cyclones are the Matamoros-based faction of the CDG. They have fought a long-running battle with the Metros in Reynosa, with both sides attacking each other’s strongholds at least since 2015. The Cyclones draw much of their influence from their control of the border crossing between Matamoros and Brownsville, Texas, along which drugs, weapons and contraband all flow, according to Borderland Beat. Since a flare-up of violence in 2015, the Cyclones seemed to have been pretty quiet until mounting the consorted attack, backed up by the Scorpions, on Reynosa in 2021. Five alleged members of this alliance have been charged with carrying out the Reynosa killings.

The Cyclones are also engaged in a war with the Northeast Cartel, a splinter Zetas group, for control of the municipalities of San Fernando, El Mante, Ocampo, Mendez, San Carlos and Ciudad Tula.

The Scorpions were founded after a fallout between two of the foremost CDG leaders, Osiel Cárdenas Guillén, and his brother, Antonio Ezequiel. Created to stand up to the Zetas founded by Osiel, they were made up of former police and military personnel and stood out early on for their brutality and use of military-style tactics. After Antonio Ezequiel’s death in 2010, the group was believed to have been disbanded. But in 2015, in Matamoros and Tampico, a faction of the CDG emerged, calling themselves Scorpions Group (Grupo Escorpiones). They maintained their police connections as their leader was the former head of police of Madero, a city in Tamaulipas, before he too was killed.

Today, the Scorpions act very much in concert with the Cyclones. Some analysts describe the Scorpions as the armed wing of the Cyclones, viewing them as a single criminal threat. Their base is in Matamoros but messages left next to bodies confirm they have a presence in much of Tamaulipas. The June massacre, blamed on the two groups, marked the high point of a long and drawn-out conflict with the Metros, the CDG offshoot in Reynosa. This conflict has centred around control of the Pharr-Reynosa Bridge, an essential thoroughfare for drug trafficking between Tamaulipas and Texas.

However, the flurry of national attention and increased military operations in Tamaulipas seems to have contributed to a truce between the Scorpions, Metros and Rojos.

Metros

While the Metros were formed in Matamoros by Osiel Cárdenas Guillén back in the 1990s, their power base is now firmly in Reynosa and along Tamaulipas’ northern border in the towns of Camargo, Mier and Miguel Alemán. This control has lasted across several rivalries, as the Metros have been at the center of the CDG’s continued fragmentation. First, after the deaths and arrests of several Cárdenas Guillén family members, the Metros sided with Jorge Eduardo Costilla Sánchez, who assumed much of the control of the cartel. The Rojos, a rival faction that supported the Cárdenas Guillén clan were driven out of the border area toward the south of Tamaulipas in 2011.

In 2021, the Metros were the target of a campaign of violence by the Cyclones and Scorpions, culminating in the killing of 19 people in Reynosa last June. They signed a truce with the Cyclones, Scorpions and Rojos in July 2021 but alleged Metros leader, José Alfredo Hernández Campos, alias Comandante Calamardo, was found dead in September.

The Metros have also battled the Northeast Cartel for control of small municipalities between Reynosa and Nuevo Laredo. However, these appear to now be firmly in the hands of the Northeast Cartel.

Rojos

The split between the Metros and the Rojos in 2011 saw the latter come off worse. While their origins lie with the Cárdenas Guillén family, today they control less territory than their rivals in Tamaulipas. Their power base is in the very south of the state, along the border with Veracruz, centered in Altamira, Ciudad Madero and most importantly, Tampico.

They have engaged in sporadic violence but have seemed to mainly stay out of the recent violence focused on Reynosa. They were part of the Gulf Cartel truce in July 2021.

Panthers

Little has been reported of late on the Panthers (Panteras), a smaller CDG offshoot based in southeastern Tamaulipas. They were formed and led by Eleno Salazar Flores, alias “Pantera 6,” and were also made up of former police officers used mainly for assassinations. Following Salazar Flores’ arrest in 2014, the group went quiet. Their area of control currently covers the municipalities of Abasolo, Soto la Marina, Aldama and González. These form a crucial corridor to move drugs from Veracruz up to the border.

As few outbreaks of violence have been reported there, it can be assumed the Panthers maintain a neutral collaboration with other CDG factions in the state.

Zetas Splinter Groups

Northeast Cartel

The legitimacy of the Northeast Cartel (Cartel del Noreste – CDN) as the heirs to the Zetas is unimpeachable. When Zetas founder Omar Treviño Morales, alias “Z-42,” was captured in 2015, his brother Juan Francisco, pounced on the opportunity. The newly minted Northeast Cartel has become one of Mexico’s prime criminal threats, with a presence in key northern and central Mexican states where it is fighting prominent enemies, including the Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación – CJNG).

But the core of the Northeast Cartel’s power and revenue comes from its control of Nuevo Laredo, a key crossing into the United States, where eye-watering quantities of drugs are regularly seized. To the southeast, it has a presence in Mier, Camargo and Ciudad Alemán, where it has taken on the Metros.

The CDN’s armed wing, known as Tropa del Infierno (Hell Troop), rose to notoriety in 2019 and 2020 for a number of violent attacks on the CJNG and clashes with authorities.

However, drawing so much attention has not been a good thing. In 2021, Mexican security forces have hammered the CDN, killing a number of its members and arresting the leader of Tropa del Infierno in August.

It will also likely now come under pressure from more united CDG factions, which signed a truce in July and may choose to face off with a common enemy, the CDN.

Old School Zetas

While none of the Zetas splinter groups can hold a candle to the ferocity and membership of the originals, the Old School Zetas (Zetas Vieja Escuela) have tried their best. Beginning from a base in northern Veracruz, they have gradually spread across much of central and eastern Mexico in recent years, with operations in as Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, Coahuila, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí and Quintana Roo.

But one of their main objectives, much like their rivals from CDG, has been the control of Tamaulipas border towns. The Old School Zetas have been operating in the municipalities of Rio Bravo, Valle Hermoso, San Fernando, all of which area a straight shot up the Pacific coast from their Veracruz headquarters.

Their presence in Tamaulipas, to date, has been somewhat understated compared to their rivals. The Northeast Cartel, another Zetas splinter group, has been more proactive in carving out territory in the northern tip of Tamaulipas, especially in Nuevo Laredo.

However, that may change as it appears the Old School Zetas may have crossed the aisle and allied themselves with the Cyclones to take the fight to the CDN.

It is uncertain how the Old School Zetas will be affected by the truce between CDG splinter groups, which also seems focused on ousting the CDN

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'Narcos' Wagner Moura On His Role As Pablo Escobar | Los Angeles Times

 

 

Wagner Moura of 'Narcos' put on 40 pounds to play Pablo Escobar. Shedding the weight was part of purging the character. Credits: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=it5FFr9EscE

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Accusations against Mexico’s Former Top Cop Grow in US Courts

Accusations against Mexico’s Former Top Cop Grow in US Courts

Evidence and accusations are piling up against Mexico's former top security official Genaro García Luna, as US prosecutors proffer new records in their case alleging he pocketed bribes from drug traffickers and Mexico demands the return of millions of alleged illegal assets.

In a September 29 filing in a New York federal court, prosecutors said they would provide Luna's defense lawyers with new evidence to be used in the trial against him, including Mexican government documents, US State Department records, photos and bank records. García Luna, who served as Mexico's secretary of public security from 2006 to 2012 under then-President Felipe Calderón, is accused of accepting multimillion-dollar bribes from the Sinaloa Cartel in exchange for letting the group traffic multi-ton loads of cocaine into the United States.

The filing comes a little more than a week after Mexico’s Financial Intelligence Unit (Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera - UIF) announced its “first civil lawsuit abroad to recover assets related to illegal financial operations carried out by Genaro García Luna."

After leaving office, García Luna -- along with a former high-ranking Mexican government official, several business associates, a network of companies and his wife -- illegally obtained at least $250 million from the Mexican government between 2012 and 2018 through a “complicated unlawful government-contracting scheme,” officials alleged in the lawsuit filed in a Florida court on September 21. Those funds were then allegedly transferred out of Mexico using an “extensive” network in order to “hide the stolen funds in numerous assets” located in the United States.

US authorities arrested García Luna in the state of Texas in December 2019 on cocaine trafficking conspiracy charges and making false statements. He pleaded not guilty to the charges last year.

Shortly after his arrest, UIF Head Santiago Nieto filed two complaints against García Luna with anti-corruption prosecutors in Mexico. The agency alleged he used tax havens around the world – including the United States, Barbados and Hong Kong – to conceal more than $50 million in bribes he is suspected of accepting from drug traffickers.

InSight Crime Analysis

As the evidence in García Luna's drug case mounts, the latest allegations levied by the Mexican government point at suspected criminal activity exceeding what occurred during his time as a security official.

While US prosecutors allege García Luna used his role atop Mexico’s security forces to act as a key conduit for one of Latin America’s most powerful organized crime groups, Mexican officials said his misconduct extended to being the "principal architect" and one of the "ultimate beneficiaries” of a vast “money laundering empire” they dubbed “the Enterprise.”

Through suspected bribery, bid tampering and corruption in Mexico, officials allege he “used his influence with the Mexican government to override Mexican government contract and bidding procedures, and to ensure selection of his coconspirators for multiple government contracts,” according to the lawsuit.

Between 2015 and 2019, Mexican authorities identified at least 30 transfers totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars of allegedly stolen government funds deposited by the network into accounts in the United States that were then routed to accounts in Barbados. All of those accounts, according to the complaint, were supposedly controlled by García Luna and his associates.

What’s more, the group “engaged in additional racketeering activity” by using the stolen funds to “manage and maintain” the money laundering network through “international wire transfers, property tax payments, fee payments, and other payments to maintain, upkeep, and manage the Enterprise,” officials said.

García Luna was never charged with any wrongdoing in Mexico during or immediately after his time as a top security official. Only after almost a year of being detained in the United States did Mexican authorities even issue an arrest warrant for him on illicit enrichment charges.

The scale of alleged corruption, if proven, is not only egregious – it is shocking for a man once entrusted with designing and executing Mexico's assault on organized crime and drug trafficking.

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